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 This dissertation examines how organizations are coordinated across and within firm 
boundaries, and how uncertain environments affect the coordination. In the first essay, I 
investigate strategic behaviour of firms in the vertical relationships by analyzing location 
choices with referencing their customers. While proximate location to customers facilitates 
coordination in the vertical relationships, it is a relation-specific investment for the firm, and 
vulnerable to contingencies originating from customers. To deal with the risk, firms not only 
“underinvest” in the relation-specific locations, but also actively invest in real options. 
Specifically, upon uncertainties in location of customers, the likelihood of firms’ choosing 
the same locations as their customers’ decreases while the likelihood of choosing 
neighbouring locations increases. Likewise, upon uncertainties in demand from customers, 
likelihood of firms’ choosing locations proximate to their current customers decreases while 
the likelihood of choosing locations proximate to their potential customers increases. 
Empirical analysis of North American listed firms between 2007 and 2011 generally supports 
the hypotheses. 
In the second and third essays, I explore the coordination inside the firm boundary by 
looking at the integration of top management teams (TMT) between the headquarters and 
acquired firms (the second essay), and the headquarters and subsidiaries (the third essay). The 
second essay adopts post-acquisition integration as the empirical context, and argues that the 
need for coordination leads to TMT integration between acquirer and target after acquisition, 
but the likelihood of integration diminishes over time as coordination mechanisms become 
more formalized, and coordination roles are delegated to lower level of acquirer’s hierarchy. 
In the third essay, I examine the coordination in the hierarchy by looking at TMT integration, 
and demonstrate how it is modified by modularity holding company structure introduces. I 
propose that holding company structure facilitates application of CC scheme by the 
vi 
 
headquarters while it lowers the need for feedback of subsidiaries owned by a holding 
company in order to design CC schemes. In addition, it better enables the headquarters to 
focus on urgent issues during economic crisis by operating with less intervention. Empirical 
data from 2006 to 2010 show that TMT integration patterns are consistent with the 
hypotheses in these two essays.  
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WHICH CUSTOMERS DO FIRMS FOLLOW AND HOW CLOSELY?:  
UNCERTAINTIES IN GLOBAL SUPPLY CHAINS AND REAL OPTION STRATEGIES 






Previous studies demonstrate that firms are likely to enter and stay in countries where 
customers locate. Building on this finding as a baseline, this study extends our knowledge about 
firms’ location choices in two ways. First, by distinguishing present and potential customers, I 
argue that while firms are attracted by both present and potential customers, they strategically 
change the balance between the two types of customers depending on conditions that they face. 
Second, by distinguishing customers’ presence in host or target countries and in other nearby 
countries, I argue that while both loci of customers’ presence attract firms, the magnitudes of 
attractions differ depending on conditions that focal firms face. Adopting real option theory, I 
propose that when firms face uncertainty about future demand from present customers, they 
are more attracted to the presence of potential customers. On the other hand, when firms face 
uncertainty about future location of customers, they are more attracted to (present or potential) 
customers’ presence in other nearby countries rather than in host or target country. Exploiting 
different business environments originating from capital intensity of customers, uncertainty of 
customer performance, and capital intensity of focal firms, are the three sets of hypotheses 
presented. Empirical test, using rich data from COMPUSTAT customer segment file and 
ORBIS disks, generally support these hypotheses. This study is a significant contribution to 
researchers and practitioners as it identifies a new set of strategic dimensions about location 




As global supply chains have become a norm in today’s international business, their 
geographic configurations have been attracting great interest from researchers, and we have 
seen substantial developments in studies, for example, on agglomeration patterns of 
multinational firms (Alcácer, 2006; Alfaro & Chen, 2014) and locational designs of mutually-
linked subsidiaries within multinational firms (Baltagi, Egger, & Pfaffermayr, 2007; 
Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, & Naughton, 2007; Chen, 2011). Yet location choice studies 
considering inter-firm relationships between suppliers and customers are not abundant. The 
current study focuses on this gap and contributes to broader streams of literatures on global 
supply chains by investigating how the presence of customers affect location choice strategy, 
and especially by identifying specific strategic decisions about location choices that focal 
firms pursue. 
Previous studies about effects of customers’ presence have found that firms are likely 
to choose locations close to their customers, and the supplier-customer relationships at home 
are often recreated in host countries (Martin, Mitchell, & Swaminathan, 1995; Martin, 
Swaminathan, & Mitchell, 1998; Schmitt & Van Biesebroeck, 2013). Building on these 
findings, this study further extends our knowledge in two ways. First, it finds differentiated 
and non-monotonic effects of present versus potential customers. Second, by examining 
(present or potential) customers’ presence in the host or target country as well as in other 
nearby countries, it identifies another differentiated and non-monotonic effects originating 
from loci of customers (i.e. presence of customers in the host or target country versus other 
nearby countries). Figure 1 is an illustrative explanation on these elements. 
The theoretical angle utilized for articulating these differentiated effects is the real 
option theory (Damaraju, Barney, & Makhija, 2015; Dixit & Pindyck, 1995; Folta & O'Brien, 
3 
 
2004; Klingebiel & Adner, 2015; Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Myers, 1977). Real option 
theory posits that as the future is more uncertain, holding alternative opportunities or real 
options is more valuable. Applied to location choices of firms, this logic leads to testable 
propositions. When firms face uncertainty on future demand from customers, they would 
seek real options concerning their customer bases by choosing locations close to potential 
customers. In addition, if the uncertainty they face is about geographic locations of 
customers, they would choose locations that provide better access to customers not only in 
the host or target country, but also in other nearby countries which allows them to build 
export platforms and continue to cater customers in wider range of locations. Such location 
choices generate real options for the access to customers.  
These extensions of our knowledge about location choice strategy are significant 
because they identify new areas of strategic behavior by firms. Firms and their customers are 
interdependent and coordinated for mutual benefits, sometimes to the extent that they are 
called “hybrid” organizations (Williamson, 1991). At the same time, however, they keep 
significant room for autonomous strategy. This study recognizes the tension between 
interdependence and autonomy, and reveals strategic behaviors of focal firms upon location 
choices.  
================================================= 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
================================================= 
 Hypotheses derived from the propositions mentioned above are tested with archival 
data. The research question in this paper demands significant amount of data, and it is 
probably the reason why not so many studies have been done on this research question. First, 
to identify pairs of focal firm and present customers, firm-level information on supplier-
customer relationships is necessary. Second, to find locations of focal firms and customers, 
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information on worldwide locations of the sample firms is required. Third, because focal 
firms and customers are from different countries, such worldwide location data needs to 
include at least large firms from around the world. Furthermore, the research question 
requires significant variance in the conditions that focal firms face. Ideally, focal firms or 
customers should be from various industries so that variances can be exploited in different 
business environments. To overcome these challenges, COMPUSTAT customer segment file 
and ORBIS database are used. COMPUSTAT customer segment file identifies supplier-
customer relationships at firm level, and includes firms from various industries. On the other 
hand, ORBIS provides worldwide information about public and private companies including 
their equity ownerships. As I will explain in more detail later, these data sets enable the test 
in this paper. 
 The next section reviews previous studies related to supplier-customer relationships in 
economic geography, before it identifies the research gap. Then, specific hypotheses are 
presented in the following section. Design of empirical analysis and its results are explained 
in detail in the section following above. The last section concludes with discussion on 
limitations and implications of this paper. 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 The effect of customer presence has been studied as one of basic agglomeration 
economies in economic geography (Marshall, 1920). The benefit of locating near customers 
is not limited to the lower transportation cost (Fujita, Krugman, & Venables, 2001). Resource 
dependency theory argues that firms depend on external environment including customers, 
and need to manage uncertainties of environment. There are multiple ways to manage 
uncertainties including acquisitions of other firms (Pfeffer, 1972; Williamson, 1991). Close 
location is another way of control. It improves monitoring and alleviates information 
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asymmetries (Kalnins and Lafontaine, 2013). In addition, by facilitating interaction with 
customers, it nurtures relational competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998), and enhances 
innovations (Porter, 1990). These effects are confirmed by empirical studies. For example, 
Glaeser and Kerr (2009) demonstrate that local presence of customers, along with other 
factors - such as local presence of suppliers, local labor pool, and level of knowledge 
spillovers - encourages creation of new manufacturing firms. Adopting a different context, 
Alcácer and Chung (2014) examine how each of agglomeration economies and structure of 
each factor market affect location choice of foreign firms. Though it is not the main variable, 
presence of customers is shown to have positive effect on entries by foreign firms. 
 For the purpose of this paper, however, these studies on agglomeration economies are 
not satisfactory in the sense that they capture the presence of customers only at industry level. 
Therefore, we cannot tell from these studies whether firms are following their present 
customers or exploring new customers. 
 In this aspect, Martin et al. (1998) and Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013) take one 
step further using data in automobile industry. Both studies identify present and potential 
customers at firm level. Martin et al. (1998) confirm that presence of present as well as 
potential customers leads to focal firm’s entry to a foreign market. In the same vein, Schmitt 
and Van Biesebroeck (2013) show that previous vertical relationships with customers lead to 
focal firms choosing locations near those present customers. In addition, after controlling the 
endogenous effect of previous relationships, locational proximity increases the probability of 
successfully signing the supply contracts with customers. In short, firms benefit from 
locations close to both present and potential customers. The dependent variable in this study 
is not location choice, but we can reasonably infer from the positive effects of locational 
proximity on signing contracts that firms should be geographically attracted by presence of 
present as well as potential customers. 
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 These studies that identify present and potential customers at firm level significantly 
improve our understanding. However, they show only aggregated effects of the two customer 
types, and therefore a question about how these effects varies in different circumstances 
remains unanswered. This paper targets this gap by exploring variations in differentiated 
effects of present and potential customers’ presence.  
 Another gap this study targets is related to the measurement of customers’ presence. 
Schmitt and Van Biesebroeck (2013) adopt a pair of focal firm and customer as unit of 
observation. It is reasonable for them because the dependent variable they are interested in is 
the event of contract signing between the two firms. However, to understand firms’ location 
choice, the aggregated presence of customers should be the key variable. In this respect, 
Martin et al. (1998) is more straightforward. Its context is about entry into US market by 
Japanese auto suppliers and it shows that greater presence of customers facilitates more entry 
of the firms. In a one-country context, however, presence of customers is considered only in 
the host country. It is not a flaw of the study itself because at the time of the sample, 1989-
1990, most of firms had just started to enter foreign markets, and the scope of their operations 
was usually confined to the host countries. However, as globalization develops, firms have 
established multiple subsidiaries around the world and developed subsidiary network where 
each subsidiary is inter-connected with offering and receiving goods and services within or 
across firm boundaries (Ghemawat, 2005). Reflecting this development, studies in 
international economics have started to take into account effects of other countries as well as 
host country (Baltagi et al., 2007; Blonigen et al., 2007; Chen, 2011). Borrowing these 
techniques in international economics, this study considers presence of customers both in the 
host country and other countries. The benefit of it is substantial not only because presence of 
customers in other country simply matters, but also because it matters in an interestingly non-
monotonic way. Customers’ presence in the host country and other countries has 
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differentiated effects on focal firms’ location choices, which reflect focal firms’ strategic 
behaviors as the following section explains further.  
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
 Before explaining main hypotheses, it is necessary to recognize the baseline 
hypothesis confirmed by previous studies as I explained in the previous section. 
Baseline Hypothesis: Firms are likely to locate in or enter countries that are the 
same as or proximate to their (either present or potential) customers’ 
 Building on the baseline hypothesis, the research question of this paper is how firms 
choose locations differently in relation to their present and potential customers in different 
circumstances. More specifically, firms may be attracted by either present or potential 
customers differently, or they may be attracted by customers’ presence either in the host or 
target country, or in other nearby countries. To answer this question, real option theory is 
applied as a theoretical guideline. In this section, this paper will explain how real option 
theory can be applied, and posit concrete hypotheses based on the theoretical arguments. 
Real Option Theory 
 Real option theory regards firm’s investment as generation of opportunities (Dixit & 
Pindyck, 1995; Myers, 1977). For example, building production capacity in a country gives a 
firm options to either utilize and further develop the capacity or to leave the capacity unused 
depending on situations (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994). This option is valuable if business 
conditions in the future is unpredictable, and if adapting to the new condition requires 
significant time or cost. Klingebiel and Adner (2015) has defined three conditions of real 
option investments: sequencing, low initial commitment, and reallocation. Real option 
investments are initiated by partial investments with preparation for sequential changes of 
commitment level upon resolution of uncertainty. Once future conditions are realized, the 
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focal firm reallocates resources so that they can reap profit to their maximum from the new 
business conditions. Real option theory has been applied to many strategic fields including 
diversification (Folta & O'Brien, 2004), divestiture (Damaraju et al., 2015), joint ventures 
(Kumar, 2005), innovation (Klingebiel & Adner, 2015), and location choice in view of 
exchange rate (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Rangan, 1998) and labor cost (Fisch & Zschoche, 
2012).  
 This paper applies real option theory to a new context: firm’s location choice in 
relation to their customers. There are two kinds of real option investments involved in this 
context. First, a firm may choose a location close to potential customers in order to generate 
alternative revenue source for the future. This is especially important when present customers 
are not reliable as a future revenue source. For example, performance of present customers 
may deteriorate, and they may cut down the operation, which leads to lower demand of the 
focal firm’s products. Taking into account such possibilities, focal firms would begin their 
operations near potential customers’ locations, develop relationships with them, and 
sequentially expand or shrink the operation according to the updated information about 
demand from present and potential customers. A successful example of this is Visteon in 
Slovakia. As a former subsidiary of Ford Motor Company, it gained most of the revenue from 
sales to Ford when they announced investment in Slovakia. However, the investment did not 
target Ford. Instead, Kia as well as PSA had plans to open plants there. Visteon’s investment 
corresponded to them, and they successfully supplied to Kia after its opening a plant in 2005, 
followed by expansions of the supply in following years. This success enabled Visteon 
expand their customer base, and better manage the uncertainty of customers as revenue 
sources. 
 Second, firms may choose location not in the same country as customers, but in other 
country near customers’ locations, and build export platform (Ekholm, Forslid, & Markusen, 
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2007) so that the subsidiary can cater to customers even after they change locations around. 
Chung, Lee, Beamish, and Isobe (2010) found that multinational firms invest more in export 
platforms rather than subsidiaries of local market orientation to manage uncertainty about 
future demand. Likewise, firms would like to invest in real options by locating in a country 
from which they can export to customers’ locations when future location of customers is not 
predictable. 
Hypotheses 
 I will empirically test my argument by leveraging three kinds of variations in business 
environments: capital intensity of customers, uncertainty of customer performance, and 
capital intensity of focal firms. Each kind of business environment requires focal firms to 
manage different uncertainties. I will explain one by one and posit hypotheses. Note that all 
the hypotheses are not about the main effects, but about moderating effects of business 
environments. Both present and potential customers attract focal firms, but the degree of 
attraction should differ in the ways hypotheses predict. 
Capital intensity of customers. When capital intensity of customers is low, 
customers are likely to change locations more frequently. It is because fixed cost of 
establishing subsidiaries is low, and giving up incumbent locations and opening new 
operation elsewhere more frequently makes economic sense. Bernard and Jensen (2007) 
confirms this by showing less capital intensive plants are more likely to be shut down using 
plant-level data in the US. Furthermore, Swenson (2005) demonstrates that US firm’s choice 
of outsourcing destination is less sensitive to cost changes in host countries when the industry 
is more capital-intensive. The author argues that it is because outsourcing firms require more 
tailoring of production, and searching production service providers that meet the 
requirements is more costly in capital-intensive industries. Due to the differences in fixed 
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costs and requirements for tailoring production, capital intensities of customers affect their 
flexibilities (Kogut & Kulatilaka, 1994; Lee & Song, 2012).  
Facing customers that are less capital-intensive and more footloose, focal firms want 
to manage the uncertainty over customers’ locations in the future. In such a situation, 
investments in export platform, positioning near customer locations, generate relevant real 
options. An export platform can cater to multiple countries. Thus, even after a customer shuts 
down a subsidiary in one location, the export platform continues to operate for catering to 
customers in other locations, or for catering to a new location of the customer. Therefore, the 
real option of export platform is more valuable when the location of demand is uncertain 
(Chung et al., 2010). As a result, focal firms are less likely to locate in the same countries as 
present or potential customers, but more likely to locate in other countries having good access 
to customers. 
Hypothesis 1a: The likelihood for focal firms to choose the same country as 
(either present or potential) customers’ decreases if capital intensity of 
customers is low 
 Hypothesis 1b: The likelihood for focal firms to choose countries proximate to 
(either present or potential) customers’ increases if capital intensity of 
customers is low 
Uncertainty of customer performance. In the context where customers are 
competing with their rivals, demand of focal firm’s product by customers is not necessarily 
stable (Aggarwal & Wu, 2014; Tripsas, 2008). Customers may radically change their product 
design, and choose to use different set of components (Tripsas, 2008). Or customers may 
shift their emphasis across product categories (Aggarwal & Wu, 2014). More simply, 
customers may fail and exit the market.  
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 As the simplest measure for uncertainty of demand by customers, this paper focuses 
on customer performance. When customer performance in the future is uncertain, focal firms 
are exposed to the risk of losing demand from present customers. Therefore, they should 
commit less to locations close to present customers. 
Hypothesis 2a: The likelihood for focal firms to choose countries that are the 
same as or proximate to those of present customers decreases if performance of 
customers is uncertain 
Alternatively, it is beneficial for a focal firm to seek real option by investing in 
locations near potential customers, and developing relationships with them to broaden 
customer base. With broader customer base, the focal firm can manage potential loss of 
demand from a present customer more effectively because they have potential alternative 
revenue sources as well as capability of expanding business with other customers more 
rapidly taking advantage of experience they have already accumulated with them. 
 However, seeking limited potential customers locating a specific country is still risky 
because performance of potential customers is also uncertain. Instead, focal firms should 
invest in export platforms from which they can cater to wider range of potential customers 
located in multiple countries. Therefore, I posit the following hypotheses on the effects of 
location by potential customers. 
Hypothesis 2b: The likelihood for focal firms to choose countries that are 
proximate to those of potential customers increases if performance of customers 
is uncertain 
Capital intensity of focal firms. The last set of hypotheses is related to capital 
intensity of focal firms. Capital intensity affects the ease of changing locations as is discussed 
above. If the same logic is applied to focal firms, subsidiaries of capital-intensive focal firms 
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stay in the same locations longer, and turn out to be more exposed to any risks of events that 
can happen as time passes. First, while a subsidiary of a focal firm is operating in a country, it 
may lose demand from present customers because of deterioration of present customer’s 
profitability, or change of present customer’s preferences. Therefore, to pursue real option 
value under this uncertainty, focal firms should invest more in relationships with potential 
customers. This is similar to hypothesis 2 where customer’s profitability in the future is 
uncertain. However, potential customers’ profitability is not particularly uncertain, and 
therefore, focal firms can engage in developing relationships with specific potential 
customers in the host countries in this case. Hence, potential customer’s presence in the host 
or target country as well as in other nearby countries should attract focal firms. 
Second, subsidiaries of capital-intensive firms may be exposed to a risk of customer’s 
location changes. Though customers are not particularly footloose, their time horizon is 
shorter than focal firms’. However, products in capital-intensive industries are typically more 
firm-specific or user-specific (Nunn & Trefler, 2013). Thus customers are likely to be 
required to source the same product from focal firms even after they change locations. As 
such, the uncertainty in locations of customers should not affect significantly. 
Hypothesis 3a: The likelihood for focal firms to choose countries that are the 
same as or proximate to those of present customers decreases if capital 
intensity of a focal firm is high 
Hypothesis 3b: The likelihood for focal firms to choose countries that are the 
same as or proximate to those of potential customers increases if capital 
intensity of a focal firm is high 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Summary of Test 
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 To better comprehend how customers’ locations around the globe affect focal firm’s 
location choices, this paper examines (a) the effect of present and potential customers’ 
presence in the host country, (b) the effect of present and potential customers’ presence in 
other countries, and (c) how the effects of (a) and (b) are contingent on characteristics of 
different business environments. By analyzing differentiated effects of present and potential 
customers, and of their presence in the host country and other countries, this scheme of 
analysis is able to show that focal firms are operating real option strategy so that they manage 
uncertainties originating from business environment they are facing.  
 This analysis is possible only if the data set satisfies the following conditions. First, 
pairs of focal firms and present customers need to be identified. In agglomeration literature, 
supplier-buyer relationships have typically been identified at industry level (Alcácer & 
Chung, 2014; Alfaro & Chen, 2014). However, to find focal firm’s strategic balance between 
present and potential customers, present customers need to be identified at firm level. Second, 
the global level analysis like this study requires comprehensive list of subsidiaries owned by 
focal firms and present and potential customers. The question of this paper is which country 
focal firms choose from possible alternatives, which obviously demands information of 
firm’s location around the globe. In addition, this analysis requires information about 
customer’s presence not only in the host country, but also in other countries. Comprehensive 
list of subsidiaries is needed to construct the variable for customer’s presence in other 
countries. Third, the data set should include, at least, major multinational firms around the 
world because customers of a focal firm are not necessarily from the same country. For a US 
auto supplier such as Johnson Controls, for example, not only US assemblers but also foreign 
assemblers like Volkswagen and Toyota Motor are present or potential customers. Thus, 
unlike conventional data sets (e.g. Directory of Japanese Companies Abroad published by 
Toyo Keizai) used in previous studies, the data set in this study should include all the major 
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multinational firms around the world. Fourth, to scrutinize different effects of customers in 
different business environments, the data set needs to have enough variation in focal firms’ 
business environments. For instance, focal firms or customers should be represented from a 
variety of industries. Previous studies do not satisfy all of these conditions. 
 This paper’s approach is threefold. First, the effects of present and potential 
customers’ presence in host country and other countries are assessed. Then, moderating 
effects of various business environments are examined. Finally, in addition to static analysis 
of focal firms’ locations, dynamic analysis of entry is conducted, and I compared those sets 
of results to infer what decisions focal firms make and how those decisions result in current 
locations in relation to their customers.  
 Before proceeding to empirical test, I will explain the sample, data source, and 
variables. 
Data and Sample 
 The sample of firms with present customer information comes from COMPUSTAT 
Customer Segment file between 2006 and 2011. By regulation, firms are required to report 
their major customers if sales to each customer exceed 10% of total revenues, or if firms 
regard the sales to those customers as important to their business. Frequently, firms also 
report values of sales to each major customer. This data set is often used by finance or 
accounting researchers (Hui, Klasa, & Yeung, 2012; Johnson, Karpoff, & Yi, 2015). My 
sample consists of manufacturing firms reporting their major customers. 
 Information about subsidiaries of sample firms and their customers is taken from 
vintages of ORBIS disks published between January and March of each year from 2007 to 
2012. ORBIS disks are published by Bureau van Dijk, and contain information about more 
than 50 million public and private companies worldwide. Due to its uniquely broad coverage, 
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ORBIS including its subset data base such as AMADEUS (European company subset of 
ORBIS) has been used in numerous studies (Belenzon, Patacconi, & Zarutskie, 2015; 
Belenzon & Tsolmon, 2015; Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012; Dharmapala & Riedel, 
2013), and its practical manual has been published by economists recently (Kalemli-Ozcan, 
Sorensen, Villegas-Sanchez, Volosovych, & Yesiltas, 2015). ORBIS tracks and constantly 
updates the list of firms included in the data, and their ownership information. Allowing a 
certain time lag for reflecting the latest information, it could be assumed that a vintage 
published in early months of a year represents ownership information of the previous year. 
Staff from Bureau van Dijk confirmed that this assumption is reasonable. Therefore, it could 
be said that the ORBIS data sets between 2007 and 2012 provide ownership information 
between 2006 and 2011. 
 Firm-customer data from COMPUSTAT are linked with ORBIS data by the following 
steps. First, focal firms in COMPUSTAT are matched with ORBIS data by comparing 
CUSIP from COMPUSTAT and ISIN from ORBIS. This matching is especially easy for US 
firms because their CUSIP is a part of ISIN. Other firms are matched by comparing company 
names and tickers from the both databases. Second, present customer names from 
COMPUSTAT are matched with ORBIS data. This step is challenging because customer 
information from COMPUSTAT provides only company names reported by focal firms, and 
those names are often abbreviated or misspelled. To tackle this challenge, after conducting 
full-name matching, I standardized both present customer names from COMPUSTAT and 
company names from ORBIS using STATA codes developed by NBER Patent Data Project. 
Through the standardization, for instance, “Internatl” and “International” in company names 
are changed to “INT”, and annotations such as “Incorporation” and “Inc.” are changed to 
“Inc”, and then dropped. Those present customer names that are not matched even with the 
standardization procedure are matched manually.  
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 Subsidiaries are identified when firms are owned by a parent company with more than 
25% equity ownership. In ORBIS, the first set of subsidiaries is identified by finding firms 
whose ultimate owner is among the sample firms (either focal firms or customers). In 
addition, the second set of subsidiaries is identified by following equity ownership linkages 
starting from the sample firms down to 10th level of hierarchical ownership structures. The 
final list of subsidiaries is a combination of these two. 
 Furthermore, potential customers are determined as follows. First, top present 
customers are identified in each year. Those are top present customers if they are the sole 
customers to the focal firms or they are the largest source of revenue for the focal firms. The 
4 digit NAICS of top present customer for each focal firm is defined as the customer 
industry. To avoid ambiguity about the customer industry, those observations are dropped if 4 
digit NAICS of top present customers is not consistent throughout the sample period. Then, 
potential customers of a focal firm are defined. Potential customers are all the customers from 
the customer industry recorded in COMPUSTAT customer segment file except for the 
present customers of the focal firms and the focal firms themselves. 
 Finally, the sample is limited to those focal firms satisfying the following conditions. 
First, focal firms are from North America. Most of the firms in COMPUSTAT segment data 
are from North America. As a result, majority of recorded customers are also from North 
America because supplier-customer relationships are developed by close interactions 
happening locally. A potential issue of including non-North American firms is that only a 
limited number of non-North American customers are reported, and thus, potential customers 
defined by the procedure mentioned above may not be comprehensive for non-North 
American focal firms. Second, focal firms have at least five identified potential customers. 
Actual potential customers are not observable, and here I define potential customers based on 
a reasonable inference from observable information. Therefore, there is a risk that the defined 
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potential customers are not comprehensive. And the risk is greater if the number of defined 
potential customers is lower since unique characteristics of each potential customers are 
reflected strongly on the measurements. By limiting the sample to those with at least five 
defined potential customers, general trends of industry are captured safely. And third, focal 
firms are manufacturing firms with customers from manufacturing industries (i.e. NAICS 31-
33).  
Resulting sample consists of 886 firm-year with 251 different focal firms in years 
from 2006 to 2011. Table 1-1 reports the size of focal firms in the sample compared with that 
of all North American manufacturing firms in COMPUSTAT. The mean of total assets in the 
sample is comparable to that of COMPUSTAT. However, extremely small and extremely 
large firms are not included in the sample. As a result, the standard deviation of firm size in 
the sample is much smaller than that of COMPUSTAT. Table 1-2 shows industries of focal 
firms in the sample compared with COMPUSTAT firms. Transportation equipment 
manufacturers are clearly overrepresented in the sample. Other than that, chemical product 
manufacturers count lower proportion of the sample, and electronic product manufacturers 
are slightly overrepresented. Table 1-3 shows industries of customers. Again, transportation 
equipment manufacturers are overly represented. Proportion of chemical manufacturers is 
lower, and proportion of computer and electronic products manufacturers is higher than it is 
in COMPUSTAT. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 1-1, 1-2, and 1-3 about here 
================================================= 
 To the location data of these firms, country controls are added. Included country 
controls are average labor cost, GDP, quality of institution (average of control of corruption, 
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government effectiveness, and regulatory quality), average tariff on imported products, and 
distance from the headquarters. They are derived from World Bank Database.  
 For each focal firm-year, 155 countries are recorded after excluding focal firms’ 
headquarters and tax havens. This is the final data used for regression estimates. 
Variables 
Presence. The unit of analysis in this paper is firm-year-country, and the first 
dependent variable is presence of a focal firm in a country. This variable is equal to 1 if a 
focal firm has at least one manufacturing subsidiaries in the focal country, and is equal to 0 
otherwise. Country-level variable instead of subsidiary-level is adopted because appearance 
or disappearance of subsidiaries is hard to interpret. Subsidiaries may be established to start 
new operations in the focal country, or to create legal entities for tax reasons. Also, 
subsidiaries may disappear because a firm terminates operation in the country, or because 
their business is transferred to other legal entities without any physical change. By adopting 
country-level observations, these issues could be avoided. 
 Another issue related to this variable is that ORBIS data sometimes fail to record the 
presence of subsidiaries. Some subsidiaries recorded in 2007, for example, disappeared in 
2008, but they come back to the data again in 2009. To alleviate the effect of recording 
errors, I recognized the absence when focal firms do not appear in the focal country for two 
consecutive years. As a result, the first and the last years of observation should be dropped 
while analyzing presence of firms because finding no record of presence in those years 
cannot be regarded as absence if presence is reported in the next or previous year. Therefore, 
the sample period of presence analysis is 2007-2010.  
Entry. The second dependent variable is entry which is equal to 1 if firms enter the 
focal country, and is equal to 0 otherwise. For entry analysis, year 2006 and 2007 should be 
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dropped. This is because absence in 2006 or 2007 is defined by two-year observations in 
2006 and 2007. Therefore, first observation of entry should be in 2008.  
 For both presence and entry, manufacturing subsidiaries of focal firms are analyzed in 
the main analysis, and sales and service subsidiaries are examined as an additional analysis. 
Presence of present customers in the host country. The first explanatory variable is 
the level of presence by present customers in the host country. Only manufacturing 
subsidiaries of them are counted as presence. This variable is measured by the following 
formula. 





𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the level of presence by present customers of focal firm i in the host country c in 
year t. As a focal firm typically has multiple present customers, J represents all the present 






where 𝑆𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 is focal firm i’s sales to customer j in year t-1. Customer sales used for the 
weight is from the previous year because customer sales should be influenced by focal firm’s 
own behavior including location choice. This endogeneity is avoided by adopting lagged 
value. 𝑃𝐶′𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 in equation (1) is normalized presence of customer j in host country c in year t, 





∗ 100. (3) 
𝑃𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if customer j has at least one manufacturing 
subsidiary in country c in year t, and is equal to 0 otherwise. C represents all the countries in 
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the sample. Denominated by ∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑐,𝑡𝑐∈𝐶 , 𝑃𝐶
′
𝑗,𝑐,𝑡 is a normalized measure of customer j’s 
presence. The reason of this normalization is that the variable of interest, 𝑃𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 should reflect 
the weight of each customer’s significance to the focal firm (𝑊𝑖,𝑗,𝑡), not each customer’s 
degree of internationalization. 
Presence of present customers in other countries. This variable captures the 
presence of present customers in countries other than the focal one, and is a proxy of 
opportunity for focal firms to cater from the focal country to their present customers in other 
countries. Since customers’ presence near a focal country is particularly important, presence 
by customers should be inversely weighted by distance from the focal country. The 
measurement is, 
 





where 𝑃𝐶𝑖,?̅?,𝑡 is present customers’ presence in country 𝑐̅ in year t, which is calculated by the 
equation (1). Country 𝑐̅ is any country other than focal country c. 𝐷𝑐,𝑐̅ is a distance measure 
that is logged distance in km between host country c and other country 𝑐̅. As a whole, this is 
aggregated present customer’s presence in other countries inversely weighted by logged 
distance. 
Presence of potential customers in the host country. The second explanatory 
variable, presence of potential customers in the host country, or 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡, is measured by the 
following formula. Note that potential customers are defined as those that are recorded as 
present customers of any firms in COMPUSTAT customer segment file, are in the same 





∗ 100 (5) 
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where 𝑃𝑘,𝑐,𝑡 is the presence of potential customer k in country c in year t. Regarding presence 
of one potential customer as a unit, 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑖,𝑐,𝑡 is the normalized number of units in the host 
country. 
Presence of potential customers in other countries. This variable captures the 
presence of potential customers in countries other than the focal one. Parallel to presence of 
present customers in other countries calculated by equation (4), this variable is measured by, 
 





where 𝑃𝑜𝑡𝐶𝑖,?̅?,𝑡 is potential customers’ presence in country 𝑐̅ in year t, which is calculated by 
the equation (5). Country 𝑐̅ is any country other than focal country c. 𝐷𝑐,𝑐̅ is a distance 
measure that is logged distance in km between host country c and other country 𝑐̅.  
Capital intensity of customers. Capital intensity, the moderating variable of 
interest, is captured at industry level. Industry average of capital intensity is calculated by 
capital expenditure divided by worker’s wage in each 4 digit NAICS from 2006 to 2011. The 
data is from Annual Survey of Manufacturers published by US Census Bureau. Because the 
capital expenditure is significantly influenced by macro-economic conditions, capital 
intensity of industry is averaged throughout sample period. 
 To capture moderating effect of customer’s capital intensity, a dummy variable, 
which is equal to 1 if customer’s capital intensity is low, is created. Here, a potential issue is 
that industry of focal firms and that of customers are correlated. For example, when the 
customer industry is transportation equipment manufacturing, industry of most focal firms are 
also transportation equipment manufacturers.  Therefore, if the whole sample was split by 
customer’s capital intensity, industry of focal firms related to high capital intensity of 
customers would be significantly different from that of firms related to low capital intensity. 
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As a result, it is difficult to tell whether the moderating effects are driven by customers or 
focal firms. To solve this issue, the capital intensity of customers is compared within groups 
of focal firms in the same industry (at 3 digit-NAICS level), and the dummy for high capital 
intensity customers is assigned to those focal firms whose customer’s capital intensity is 
above mean of their groups. Following this procedure, characteristics of focal firms are 
reasonably controlled for. For example, among focal firms in transportation equipment 
manufacturing industry, those with motor vehicle manufacturing customers are coded as 1 for 
capital intensive customer dummy, and those with aerospace product and parts manufacturing 
customers are coded as 0. The empirical analysis exploits such variations within each 
industry of focal firms. 
 When there is no variance in capital intensity of customers within an industry group 
of focal firms, the observations are dropped. 
Uncertainty of performance by customers. The second moderator of interest is 
uncertainty of customer’s performance. Based on previous studies (McGahan & Porter, 2003; 
Villalonga, 2004; Waring, 1996), “firm-specific profitability” is estimated by the following 
OLS regression model with firms in the same industry at 4-digit NAICS. 
𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 = 𝛽0,𝑗 + 𝛽1,𝑗 ∗ 𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 
where, the estimated coefficient 𝛽1,𝑗 represents the persistent of firm-specific profitability in 
industry j. 𝑓𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 is firm-specific profitability of firm i in year t, and it is calculated by 
(operating profit) – (average operating profit in industry j). Conceptually, 𝛽1,𝑗 means how 
much of firm-specific profitability of the previous year is carried out to the current year. 
Larger 𝛽1,𝑗 means stable structure of industry where firms are more likely to continue current 
level of performance, whereas smaller 𝛽1,𝑗 means instable and dynamic circumstance of 
industry where firm’s performance in the future is uncertain. I used data on North American 
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firms from COMPUSTAT from 1997 to 2006. I dropped industries with less than 6 
observations.  
 Then, I assigned a dummy variable which is equal to 1 if the estimated persistence of 
firm-specific profitability in customer industry is low, and is 0 otherwise. Again, in order to 
control focal firm’s industry, I calculated the median of persistence within each group of 
focal firms from the same industry (at 3-digit NAICS), and make the dummy variable 1 if the 
persistence in the customer industry is lower than the median within the group. The 
observations are dropped when there is no variance within a group. 
Capital intensity of focal firms. The last moderator of interest is capital intensity 
of focal firms. The measure of capital intensity is the same as the one used for calculating 
capital intensity of customers. Though this variable is supposed to capture variances in focal 
firms’ characteristics, it is not desirable if this analysis compared very different industries 
such as chemical products manufacturing and computer and electronic product 
manufacturing. In such a case, it is hard to tell which differences of industry characteristics 
are driving the results. The purpose of this variable is to capture focal firm’s capital intensity 
while keeping other characteristics reasonably under control. Therefore, dummy variable for 
high capital intensity of focal firms is defined within each group of focal firms from the same 
3-digit NAICS industry. This is possible because capital intensity is defined at 4-digit NAICS 
level. 
Control variables. I added the following control variables. First, I controlled the 
level of presence by focal firm in other countries. The formula used for “level of presence by 
customers in other countries” is applied  using dummy variable representing focal firm’s 
presence. The coefficient of this variable would be positive if presence of focal firm is 
complementary and it attracts other subsidiaries in nearby country. It would be negative if 
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presence of focal firm is substitute and they avoid locations near incumbent subsidiaries. 
Then, country characteristics such as average labor cost, GDP, quality of institution (average 
of control of corruption, government effectiveness, and regulatory quality), average tariff on 
imported products, and distance from the headquarters are controlled. Data on country 
characteristics are cited from World Bank Database. Finally, fixed effects for focal firms and 
years are added. Table 1-4 and 1-5 show descriptive statistics of the variables. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 1-4 about here 
================================================= 
Empirical Model 
 The dependent variables of this analysis are presence or entry of the focal firm, and 
take 0 or 1. To estimate a model with such dependent variables, logit model is appropriate. In 
particular, because there are fixed effects for focal firms and years, conditional logit model is 
adopted. The model estimates which country the focal firm chooses for presence or entry 
conditional on that the focal firm have presence or entry in at least one country based on the 
following specification. 
Pr[𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 = 1|𝑋] =
exp⁡(𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑗,𝑡)
∑ exp⁡(𝑗∈𝐽 𝛽1𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ∗ 𝐸𝑖 + 𝛽3𝑍𝑗,𝑡)
 
𝑌𝑖,𝑡,𝑗 is the dependent variable for firm i in country j in year t, and J is a set of country 
choices. This model is estimated by maximum likelihood method, and obtained coefficients 
𝛽2 can be used for testing how effects of customers’ presence are moderated by business 
environments.  𝑋𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 represents variables about presence of present or potential customers in 
the host or target country or other countries which is unique to focal firms, country, and year. 
𝐸𝑖 means business environments focal firms face. This is unique to focal firms. Due to firm 




 Table 1-5 shows the results of conditional logit regressions. I will explain the 
baseline, main, and additional results. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 1-5 about here 
================================================= 
Baseline results. First, effects of customers are estimated as a baseline. As 
expected, presence of both present and potential customers in both host or target country and 
other countries is shown to attract focal firms. Except the effect of potential customers’ 
presence in other countries on entry, all variables about customer presence have positive and 
highly significant coefficients. 
 Coefficients of control variables are also reasonable. Focal firm’s own presence in 
other countries is negatively associated with their location choice. This shows substitution 
effects of their own subsidiaries. Besides, both presence and entry are negatively associated 
with average wage and distance from the headquarters, and positively with GDP, institutions 
and tariff of the host country. All of these results are consistent with previous studies. 
Main results. Next, I looked at the moderating effects of customers’ capital intensity 
on focal firms’ location choices. I expected that when customers are less capital-intensive, or 
more footloose, focal firms are less likely to choose the same country as customers, and 
instead more likely to choose nearby countries to develop an export platform. The results are 
consistent, concerning the effect of potential customers. According to the main effects, focal 
firms are attracted by the presence of potential customer both in the same and other countries. 
But the moderating effects suggest that the effect of potential customers in the host or target 
country is lower and that in other countries is higher if customers are less capital intensive. 
On the other hand, concerning present customers, the results are not consistent with the 
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prediction. In entry phase, there is no moderating effect. As a result, presence analysis shows 
that focal firms’ locations are less associated with present customers’ presence either in the 
host country or other countries. My interpretation is that since focal firms do not engage in 
real option strategies for present customers, they do not keep proximity to their customers 
that are moving around. 
 Then, the results about uncertainty on customer’s performance are mostly consistent 
with the predictions. I expected that focal firms are less likely to seek presence of present 
customers overall, and presence of potential customers in the host or target country. Although 
the moderating effects related to present customers’ presence are weak, and often statistically 
insignificant, signs of coefficients are consistent. Coefficients related to presence of potential 
customers are significant and consistent with the predictions. 
 Finally, the moderating effects of focal firm’s capital intensity are also found to be 
generally consistent with the predictions. I expected that focal firms of high capital intensity 
seek potential customers more, because they are exposed to uncertainty about demand from 
present customers during the longer time horizon of investment. Even though only the effect 
of presence in the host or target country on focal firm’s presence is significant, all the 
coefficients related to present customers are negative and consistent with the predictions. 
Regarding the effects of potential customers, presence in the host or target country is 
positively associated with focal firm’s location choice, and the association is highly 
significant. Effects of potential customers’ presence in other countries are not statistically 
significant.  
 In summary, the three sets of hypotheses are generally supported. Even if customer’s 
capital intensity does not moderate the effects of present customer’s presence as expected, the 
combined results over presence and entry suggest a mechanism that is consistent with the 
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hypotheses. Hypotheses about uncertainty over customer performance and capital intensity of 
focal firms are generally supported. 
Placebo test. The main analysis was about focal firm’s manufacturing subsidiaries. 
In this section, I run the same analysis to study how focal firms choose locations for sales and 
service subsidiaries for a placebo test. As sales and service subsidiaries can be established by 
lower fixed costs than manufacturing subsidiaries, locations of those subsidiaries present 
patterns that are less consistent with real option theory. Table 1-6 shows the results.  
================================================= 
Insert Table 1-6 about here 
================================================= 
 In baseline analysis, presence of any customers is found to be positively associated 
with focal firm’s location choice, which is the same as the main results. However, some 
differences emerge among control variables. Average wage of host country is positively 
associated with focal firm’s location in this analysis. This is understandable because sales and 
service activities are location-specific, and the effect of labor cost should be limited. Also, 
those activities naturally take places more in large markets where labor cost is likely to be 
high. In addition, tariff is not significant, which is consistent with the fact that sales and 
service functions are location-specific. 
 As for moderating effects of business environments, a notable finding is that there is 
consistently no moderating effect related to present customer’s presence in the host or target 
country. This is a striking evidence that real option strategy is not relevant to sales and 
service subsidiaries. For example, even if customers are footloose, focal firms can establish 
sales and service subsidiaries near the customers each time they move. Other than that, sales 
and service subsidiaries shadow manufacturing subsidiaries. When manufacturing 
subsidiaries are more attracted by presence of customers in other countries, for example, sales 
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and service subsidiaries show the same tendencies. This is an evidence of co-location of 
complementary functions (Chen, 2011). 
CONCLUSION 
This study demonstrated that manufacturing firms pursue real option value when they 
choose locations in relation to their customers. As shown by previous studies, presence of 
customers’ manufacturing subsidiaries facilitates firms’ establishing manufacturing 
subsidiaries. Recognizing this as baseline, this study found differentiated and non-monotonic 
effects of present versus potential customers, and of their presence in the host or target 
country versus other countries depending on business environments that focal firms face. A 
combination of rich data sets enabled this empirical analysis.  
This study’s contributions are three-fold. First, it contributes to the economic 
geography literature by integrating global supply chain context. Agglomeration theory has 
argued co-location of suppliers and customers, but it has not been able to consider strategic 
behaviors of suppliers determining unique global supply chains of each of them.  
Second, this paper enriches real option theory by applying it to a complex reality. 
Firms are operating real option strategies against multiple types of uncertainties. In this 
paper’s context, firms face uncertainties over customer’s future location as well as future 
demand from them, and the results suggest that firms deal with these uncertainties at the same 
time. The implication is that real option theory should incorporate multiple types of 
uncertainties, and develop theory for optimal real option strategy in such conditions. 
Third, this study contributes to our knowledge on supplier-buyer relationships. Most 
of previous studies focused on the relationships between suppliers and present customers, and 
found benefits of close relationships (for example, Williamson, 1971; Gulati and Sytch, 2007; 
Carnahan and Somaya, 2013). However, as cases of disruptive innovations show, building 
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close relationships with present customers may not an optimal strategy (Christensen and 
Bower, 1996; Danneels, 2003). Supplier-buyer relationship literature has not been highly 
successful to incorporating the risk of focusing on present customers too narrowly, and it is 
because most of the studies are based on data on present supplier-buyer relationships 
empirically. If there is no such relationship, the relation cannot be defined. In this aspect, 
location choice information is interesting since present as well as potential customers are 
playing in the same universe as suppliers. Even if there is no actual supplier-buyer 
relationship, suppliers’ strategic behavior toward potential customers can be captured by 
geographic distance between them. And this unique context provides supplier-buyer 
relationship literature with an important construct of the relationships that has been missing.  
 For practitioners, this study presents a structured way of thinking location strategy. 
Probably, location decision is not made in a completely structured way in practice. If 
managers adopt this framing of location strategy, however, they should be able to improve 




Figure 1-1: An illustrative explanation of the research question 
 





Location choices in relation to present and potential customers taking into account customers’ 












Table 1-2: Top 8 industries of focal firms, cumulatively accounting for more than 90% of the 






Table 1-3: Top 6 industries of customers, cumulatively accounting for more than 90% of the 




Variable Mean Median Min Max Std Dev
N of countries with operation 7.791139 3 1 48 9.618887
Total asset (million USD) 2054.58 428.991 6.848 26812 4134.55
Ref: Total asset of North American manufacturing firms from COMPUSTAT 
(million USD) 2260.87 139.539 0.003 233323 11387.29
NAICS (3 digit) Descriptions N of firms % Ref: % in COMPUSTAT
334 Computer and electronics 50 32% 26%
336 Transportation equipment 36 23% 6%
325 Chemical 30 19% 27%
333 Machinery 11 7% 8%
332 Fabricated metal 6 4% 3%
322 Paper 4 3% 2%
331 Primary metal 3 2% 2%
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component 3 2% 4%
NAICS (3 digit) Descriptions N of firms % Ref: % in COMPUSTAT
336 Transportation equipment 49 31% 6%
334 Computer and electronics 47 30% 26%
325 Chemical 30 19% 27%
333 Machinery 9 6% 8%
324 Petroleum and coal products 5 3% 2%
335 Electrical equipment, appliance, and component 3 2% 4%
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Table 1-4: Descriptive statistics 
  
Variable N Mean Min Max Std Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 Focal firm's presence (manufacturing subsidiary) 103850 0.017 0 1 0.12922
2 Focal firm's presence (sales and service subsidiary) 103850 0.011 0 1 0.104603 0.264
3 Focal firm's entry (manufacturing subsidiary) 103850 0.004 0 1 0.064214 0.491 0.096
4 Focal firm's entry (manufacturing subsidiary) 103850 0.003 0 1 0.055338 0.131 0.525 0.124
5 Present customer's presence in host or target country 103850 0.508 0 100 2.529734 0.173 0.132 0.075 0.070
6 Present customer's presence in other countries 103850 11.407 0 16.328 0.882438 0.050 0.064 0.008 0.024 -0.201
7 Potential customer's presence in host or target country 103850 0.465 0 45.946 1.303976 0.352 0.259 0.140 0.127 0.456 0.065
8 Potential customer's presence in other countries 103850 11.503 6.264 14.239 0.612846 0.059 0.074 0.004 0.027 0.037 0.664
9 Focal firm's presence in other countries (manufacturing subsidiary) 103850 0.434 0.103 4.010 0.544473 0.219 0.121 0.079 0.055 0.015 0.084
10 Focal firm's presence in other countries (sales and service subsidiary) 103850 0.324 0.103 3.032 0.398684 0.133 0.189 0.056 0.086 0.012 0.062
11 Capital intensity of customers 103850 0.770 0.095 3.042 0.470774 -0.032 0.002 -0.013 0.002 -0.008 -0.212
12 Persistence (contrary to uncertainty) of customer profitability 100595 0.755 0.460 0.961 0.088787 0.038 0.010 0.018 0.006 0.008 -0.039
13 Capital intensity of focal firms 103850 0.673 0.115 3.042 0.418629 -0.044 -0.008 -0.014 -0.003 -0.011 -0.185
14 Average wage of workers 53908 1013.020 0.012 5.38E+03 1188.22 0.158 0.199 0.050 0.088 0.250 0.201
15 GDP 103850 2.373E+11 0.000 1.368E+13 6.47E+11 0.284 0.254 0.117 0.125 0.383 0.000
16 Institution 103850 -0.163 -2.345 2.268 0.945561 0.160 0.166 0.064 0.079 0.228 0.238
17 Average tariff on importet goods 83752 6.055 0.020 21.210 4.41897 -0.105 -0.102 -0.044 -0.051 -0.164 -0.249
18 Logged distance in km 103850 9.013 6.594 9.701 0.479341 -0.090 -0.059 -0.047 -0.032 -0.081 -0.181
Variable 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Focal firm's presence (manufacturing subsidiary)
2 Focal firm's presence (sales and service subsidiary)
3 Focal firm's entry (manufacturing subsidiary)
4 Focal firm's entry (manufacturing subsidiary)
5 Present customer's presence in host or target country
6 Present customer's presence in other countries
7 Potential customer's presence in host or target country
8 Potential customer's presence in other countries 0.077
9 Focal firm's presence in other countries (manufacturing subsidiary) 0.032 0.081
10 Focal firm's presence in other countries (sales and service subsidiary) 0.015 0.040 0.559
11 Capital intensity of customers -0.025 -0.096 -0.141 0.032
12 Persistence (contrary to uncertainty) of customer profitability 0.018 0.021 0.164 0.057 0.291
13 Capital intensity of focal firms -0.024 -0.071 -0.197 -0.022 0.577 0.015
14 Average wage of workers 0.457 0.316 0.022 0.024 0.001 -0.001 -0.001
15 GDP 0.732 0.002 0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.414
16 Institution 0.429 0.363 0.017 0.019 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.874 0.374
17 Average tariff on importet goods -0.277 -0.365 -0.024 -0.025 -0.001 0.002 0.001 -0.467 -0.242 -0.590
18 Logged distance in km -0.182 -0.355 -0.019 -0.023 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.215 -0.084 -0.209 0.169
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Table 1-5: Conditional logit results of location choice 
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables Predictions coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e. p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.0812 0.0117 <.0001 0.1183 0.0231 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.3147 0.0769 <.0001 0.4014 0.1546 0.0094
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.5234 0.0226 <.0001 0.3048 0.0456 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.342 0.0897 0.0001 -0.00731 0.1912 0.9695
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.9108 0.1612 <.0001 -3.8744 0.5518 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers -0.00027 0.00006 <.0001 -0.00055 0.000134 <.0001
GDP 5.2E-13 3.84E-14 <.0001 5.57E-13 7.57E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.5731 0.0953 <.0001 0.799 0.1934 <.0001
Average tariff on importet goods 0.0485 0.0176 0.0058 0.0388 0.0307 0.2063
Logged distance in km -0.5679 0.0578 <.0001 -0.6765 0.0981 <.0001
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 48237 27084
N of events 1677 301
N of firms 237 106
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 6439.803 1696.076




Table 1-5: Conditional logit results of location choice (continued) 
 
  
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables Predictions coeff s.e p-value predict coeff s.e. p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.1713 0.025 <.0001 0.1383 0.0418 0.0009
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.6945 0.1658 <.0001 0.6334 0.3188 0.0469
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.6521 0.0385 <.0001 0.5084 0.0714 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -0.0485 0.1753 0.7821 -0.4751 0.3491 0.1735
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.6259 0.1748 <.0001 -2.2977 0.4733 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer - -0.1166 0.0281 <.0001 -0.0159 0.0508 0.7538
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer + -0.4688 0.1859 0.0117 -0.2458 0.3699 0.5064
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer - -0.2009 0.0417 <.0001 -0.1814 0.08 0.0234
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer + 0.5738 0.2013 0.0044 1.6911 0.4344 <.0001
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer -3.6707 0.325 <.0001 -19.1077 1.8752 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers -0.00027 0.000062 <.0001 -0.00045 0.000136 0.0011
GDP 4.83E-13 3.96E-14 <.0001 4.15E-13 8.02E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.5566 0.0984 <.0001 0.6425 0.1981 0.0012
Average tariff on importet goods 0.0415 0.0185 0.0247 0.0187 0.033 0.5719
Logged distance in km -0.5765 0.0595 <.0001 -0.668 0.1035 <.0001
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 47368 27084
N of events 1655 301
N of firms 155 106
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 5667.555 1525.011
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001
Capital intensity of customers
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Table 1-5: Conditional logit results of location choice (continued) 
  
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables Predictions coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.1288 0.0222 <.0001 0.1583 0.0405 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.3902 0.1397 0.0052 0.6603 0.2583 0.0106
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.7745 0.039 <.0001 0.652 0.0761 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.1555 0.1523 0.3072 -0.5388 0.2957 0.0684
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.5341 0.1753 <.0001 -2.4303 0.4772 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability - -0.0588 0.0264 0.0262 -0.0369 0.0518 0.4771
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability - -0.0599 0.1691 0.7233 -0.2976 0.3371 0.3772
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability - -0.3234 0.0418 <.0001 -0.3464 0.0832 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability + 0.4862 0.1879 0.0096 1.8994 0.4071 <.0001
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -4.5623 0.3516 <.0001 -16.6723 1.7707 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers -0.00027 0.000063 <.0001 -0.0005 0.00014 0.0004
GDP 4.51E-13 4.05E-14 <.0001 4.01E-13 8.24E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.5251 0.0992 <.0001 0.6197 0.201 0.0021
Average tariff on importet goods 0.0378 0.0187 0.0431 0.0191 0.0332 0.5659
Logged distance in km -0.5366 0.0611 <.0001 -0.5661 0.1066 <.0001
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 47008 26930
N of events 1652 300
N of firms 231 105
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 6013.344 1517.646
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001
Uncertainty of customer profitability
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Table 1-5: Conditional logit results of location choice (continued) 
  
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables Predictions coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.101 0.0226 <.0001 0.1585 0.0427 0.0002
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.5548 0.1611 0.0006 0.6796 0.2701 0.0119
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.3452 0.0346 <.0001 0.198 0.0599 0.0009
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.3819 0.1939 0.0489 0.2997 0.3599 0.405
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -3.7618 0.4257 <.0001 -8.7247 1.5529 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability +
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm - -0.0348 0.0264 0.1866 -0.0703 0.0501 0.1609
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm - -0.3484 0.1826 0.0564 -0.4729 0.322 0.142
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm + 0.2777 0.0403 <.0001 0.2003 0.0737 0.0066
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm + -0.011 0.2135 0.9589 -0.2724 0.407 0.5034
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm 1.9713 0.413 <.0001 5.4501 1.5581 0.0005
Average wage of workers -0.00028 0.000061 <.0001 -0.00052 0.000135 0.0001
GDP 4.9E-13 3.99E-14 <.0001 5.24E-13 7.7E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.5834 0.0974 <.0001 0.7553 0.1947 0.0001
Average tariff on importet goods 0.0447 0.0182 0.0142 0.0366 0.031 0.2386
Logged distance in km -0.5878 0.0591 <.0001 -0.678 0.0988 <.0001
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 46283 26777
N of events 1638 299
N of firms 228 104
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 5737.647 1657.534
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001
Capital intensity of focal firms
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Table 1-6: Conditional logit results of location choice for sales and service subsidiaries 
 
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e. p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.0732 0.0125 <.0001 0.0576 0.0264 0.0292
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.3749 0.0793 <.0001 0.2099 0.1772 0.2363
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.2644 0.0239 <.0001 0.187 0.0416 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.3952 0.1016 0.0001 0.6692 0.2225 0.0026
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.5861 0.2024 <.0001 -4.4666 0.5981 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers 0.000165 0.000062 0.0082 0.000127 0.000126 0.313
GDP 6.68E-13 4.17E-14 <.0001 6.95E-13 7.39E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.7664 0.1123 <.0001 0.4328 0.2164 0.0455
Average tariff on imported goods -0.0126 0.031 0.6831 -0.0575 0.0534 0.2817
Logged distance in km -0.1039 0.0785 0.1853 -0.351 0.1266 0.0055
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 48237 22316
N of events 1110 235
N of firms 233 92
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 4528.849 1259.219




Table 1-6: Conditional logit results of location choice for sales and service subsidiaries (continued)
  
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e. p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.0858 0.0279 0.0021 0.0814 0.0637 0.2014
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.9066 0.1513 <.0001 0.9069 0.4209 0.0312
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.3169 0.042 <.0001 0.3093 0.0863 0.0003
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -0.2616 0.1786 0.1429 -0.1453 0.4673 0.7559
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.232 0.2348 <.0001 -3.2505 0.6559 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -0.0148 0.0314 0.636 -0.0288 0.069 0.6761
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer -0.6384 0.1782 0.0003 -0.7674 0.4563 0.0926
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer -0.0744 0.0464 0.1088 -0.1183 0.091 0.1938
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer 0.8304 0.2128 <.0001 1.0071 0.517 0.0514
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer -0.8677 0.3533 0.0141 -4.797 1.3163 0.0003
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers 0.000194 0.000063 0.0021 0.000171 0.000128 0.1813
GDP 6.51E-13 4.28E-14 <.0001 6.17E-13 7.86E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.7187 0.1131 <.0001 0.3673 0.2188 0.0932
Average tariff on imported goods -0.0152 0.0314 0.6276 -0.0724 0.0552 0.1896
Logged distance in km -0.1272 0.08 0.1116 -0.3165 0.1303 0.0152
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 47368 22008
N of events 1096 233
N of firms 233 90
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 4437.632 1225.018
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001
Capital intensity of customers
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Table 1-6: Conditional logit results of location choice for sales and service subsidiaries (continued)
  
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.1173 0.0295 <.0001 0.0212 0.0557 0.7042
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.5149 0.1713 0.0026 0.1019 0.335 0.761
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.3353 0.046 <.0001 0.4349 0.0894 <.0001
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -0.00603 0.1958 0.9754 0.4856 0.3967 0.2209
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -1.429 0.2591 <.0001 -2.2389 0.612 0.0003
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -0.0371 0.0327 0.2571 0.0597 0.0629 0.342
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -0.0653 0.1929 0.7349 0.2969 0.3879 0.444
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability -0.0984 0.0489 0.0444 -0.2483 0.0931 0.0076
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability 0.5507 0.227 0.0153 0.4267 0.4614 0.3551
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability -0.2795 0.3206 0.3833 -8.7224 1.4095 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm
Average wage of workers 0.000173 0.000063 0.0062 0.000171 0.000129 0.1847
GDP 6.43E-13 4.3E-14 <.0001 5.73E-13 7.92E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.7322 0.1136 <.0001 0.3246 0.2184 0.1371
Average tariff on imported goods -0.0246 0.0319 0.44 -0.0905 0.0561 0.107
Logged distance in km -0.0876 0.081 0.2794 -0.2695 0.1311 0.0398
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 47368 22008
N of events 1096 233
N of firms 231 90
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 4433.076 1189.696
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001
Uncertainty of customer profitability
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Table 1-6: Conditional logit results of location choice for sales and service subsidiaries (continued)
 
Dependent variable Presence Entry
Explanatory variables coeff s.e p-value coeff s.e p-value
Present customer Presence in host or target country 0.1354 0.029 <.0001 0.0413 0.0919 0.653
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.9683 0.2056 <.0001 0.0177 0.6145 0.977
Potential customer Presence in host or target country 0.1382 0.0415 0.0009 0.2118 0.0886 0.0168
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance 0.2998 0.2316 0.1955 1.367 0.6638 0.0395
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance -5.93 0.6691 <.0001 -11.7218 2.3235 <.0001
Present customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x low cap intensity of customer
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x low cap intensity of customer
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high uncertainty of customer profitability
Present customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm -0.0478 0.0325 0.1421 0.0128 0.095 0.8924
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm -0.5201 0.223 0.0197 0.23 0.6331 0.7165
Potential customer Presence in host or target country x high cap intensity of focal firm 0.1366 0.0472 0.0038 0.1098 0.0991 0.2681
Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm -0.0833 0.2544 0.7432 -0.9307 0.6933 0.1794
Focal firm Presence in other countries i.w. by distance x high cap intensity of focal firm 4.5902 0.6597 <.0001 7.9559 2.3765 0.0008
Average wage of workers 0.000184 0.000063 0.0035 0.000164 0.000128 0.2016
GDP 6.64E-13 4.29E-14 <.0001 5.47E-13 8.43E-14 <.0001
Institution 0.7284 0.1132 <.0001 0.3387 0.2191 0.1222
Average tariff on imported goods -0.0251 0.0315 0.4259 -0.0801 0.0553 0.1479
Logged distance in km -0.1629 0.0804 0.0428 -0.258 0.1317 0.0502
Firm FE Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes
N of obs 46283 22008
N of events 1093 233
N of firms 228 90
Model Conditional logit Firth logit
-2 Log likelihood 4386.251 1225.162
LR test <0.0001 <0.0001










Operational integration after acquisition is crucial for the success of acquisition. Though our 
knowledge on post-merger integration has been enriched by case studies, little empirical 
analysis has been done. Focusing on managerial integration as a critical mechanism for 
operational integration, this study confirms that firms are more likely to adopt this mechanism 
if business areas of acquirers and acquired firms (targets) are inter-related. Also, though 
managerial integration decreases over time after acquisitions, the effect of relatedness remains. 
This study contributes to post-merger integration research by demonstrating the importance of 
managerial integration for coordinating inter-related operations, as well as the continuity of the 




 Classic transaction cost theory (e.g. Coase, 1937; Williamson, 1991) argues that firms 
control and coordinate other organizations through the ownership, or the fiat derived from the 
ownership. Though it is a compelling explanation for the boundary of the firm, the ownership 
is not the sufficient condition for control and coordination, or operational integration inside 
the firm. This issue is particularly salient in the context of acquisitions, and significant 
researches have been done to understand how to achieve desirable operational integration 
after mergers and acquisitions (e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Schweizer, 2005; Ranft & 
Lord, 2002; Puranam, Singh, & Chaudhuri, 2009). Building on those researches about post-
merger integration processes, this study develops our knowledge on operational integration 
by focusing on transfer of managers between acquirers and acquired firms (or targets) as a 
critical, but understudied mechanism of operational integration. 
 Previous studies on post-merger integration processes found the following factors to 
be critical for successful operational integration: the degree and speed of integration 
(Schweizer, 2005; Puranam et al., 2009; Ranft & Lord, 2002), organization culture of 
acquirers and targets (Schweizer, 2005), management of human resources including top 
managers of targets (Ranft & Lord, 2002; Graebner, 2004), and communications among 
people from acquirers and targets (Ranft & Lord, 2002). However, one limitation of these 
studies is that they are mostly based on case studies (Puranam’s works as notable exceptions). 
Although case studies provide rich context to understand the phenomena in detail, their 
generalizability should be supported by quantitative analysis. The current study overcomes 
this limitation by examining sizable data about post-merger integration process. 
 The mechanism of integration process studied in this paper is transfer of top 
managers. As upper echelon literature (e.g. Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein & 
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Hambrick, 1990) argues, firms are controlled by a top management team (TMT) consisted of 
managers with bounded rationality. Influenced by the composition of managers with 
individual characteristics, TMTs of different firms reach different decisions, and firms 
implement different actions. Consistent with this theory, anecdotal evidence repeatedly 
supports the importance of TMT compositions in post-merger integrations processes, 
emphasizing the importance of transfer of managers, or managerial integration between 
acquirers and targets in particular (Schweizer, 2005; Ranft & Lord, 2002). This study 
examines three kinds of managerial integration: dual assignment of a manager in both 
acquirer and target, transfer of manager from target to acquirer (up from target), and transfer 
of manager from acquirer to target (down to target). 
 Empirical analysis shows the following findings. First, relatedness of the operation by 
acquirer and target leads to higher degree of managerial integration. Second, the level of 
managerial integration decreases as more time elapses after acquisition. And third, although 
the level of managerial integration becomes lower as time elapses, the association between 
the relatedness and the higher level of integration remains. These findings support the 
importance of managerial integration as noted by previous studies. Furthermore, they suggest 
how managerial integration should change over time. As integration is a process, this 
implication is critical for our understanding of post-merger integration. 
 Relationships with previous studies in terms of empirical context deserve to be 
mentioned. To observe transfer of managers, the sample is limited to acquisitions that did not 
result in “organizational integrations” during the sample period. Though most of post-merger 
integration researches have the same issue, it is a limitation in the generalization of this study. 
However, “organizational integrations” after acquisitions are rather rare according to 
available data. In Puranam et al. (2009)’s sample of acquisitions of small technology-based 
firms by large established firms, about 50% of targets survived as separate entities. In the 
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whole universe of acquisitions that includes large targets, the proportion of surviving targets 
should be much higher. In 44,052 acquisitions reported by Zephyr database during 2000-
2006, 73% of acquirers and targets are separately identified by ORBIS database after 2006. 
Considering the possibility that IDs are not perfectly matched between Zephyr and ORBIS, 
the actual rate of targets’ survival should be even higher. 
 This study contributes to several streams of literatures. First, it enriches our 
knowledge of acquisitions in general, and post-merger integration process in particular. 
Antecedent characteristics such as organizational “fit” between acquirer and target may 
explain success of acquisitions to some extent (Datta, 1991), but post-merger integration 
process is still extremely important. This study is the first empirical study showing firms’ 
engagement in transfer of managers over time as an action for integration. 
 Second, this study more generally contributes to organization design literature by 
showing a way to achieve differentiation and integration selectively. Subunits within a firm 
confront two requirements of differentiation and integration to cope with different 
environments of their activities and to coordinate with other subunits at the same time (e.g. 
Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1987; Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990; Gulati, 
Lawrence, & Puranam, 2005). Hierarchy is one solution (e.g. March & Simon, 1958; 
Galbraith, 1977), but within hierarchy there are further varieties in coordination mechanisms 
such as impersonal, personal, and group coordination modes (Van de Ven, Delbecq, & 
Koenig Jr, 1976) as well as transfer of managers (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). Confirming 
arguments by previous works, this study empirically shows that relatedness between 
organizations lead to more intensive transfer of managers that facilitates integration. In 
addition, it is demonstrated that the integration is managed differently throughout different 
phases of inter-organizational relationships: integration can be maintained by lower intensity 
of managerial integration as relationships mature. 
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 The next section theoretically explains the research questions, and three hypotheses 
are posited. The following section empirically examines the hypotheses with providing 
information on the sample, empirical model, variables, results and robustness checks. The 
final section concludes. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Operational Integration 
 King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) conducted meta-analysis of previous studies 
on the relation between acquisition characteristics and post-acquisition performance of 
acquirers, and found insignificant relationship. According to their analysis, the insignificant 
relationship is due to missing critical variables. The following studies, therefore, search for 
further antecedent characteristics of acquisitions such as prior relationships between acquirers 
and targets (Zaheer, Hernandez, & Banerjee, 2010) as well as post-merger integration process 
(Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Schweizer, 2005; Zollo & Singh, 2004; Ranft & Lord, 2002; 
Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Håkanson, 2000; Puranam et al., 2009; Puranam, Singh, & Zollo, 
2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Graebner, 2004). The latter argues that an acquirer has to 
successfully coordinate acquired operation with their own in order to gain synergy value from 
an acquisition. For example, they may need to eliminate redundant capacity of production, 
share a common sales channels for acquired product lines, or transfer acquired knowledge to 
product development teams of acquirers for further exploitations of the knowledge. In other 
words, ownership integration is not sufficient. Effective operational integration is necessary 
for generating value from acquisitions. 
 Operational integration is carried out by sharing common language for 
communication, knowledge of each other (Zaheer et al., 2010 about effect of prior alliance 
experiences), and authority over interrelated operations, as well as introducing incentive 
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systems, and setting procedure to coordinate across different operations. In addition, 
interactions between members of organization promote socialization (Edström & Galbraith, 
1977), and nurture group identity (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Operational integration is further 
supported by these contextual factors. 
 Operational integration is particularly important when operation of target is closely 
related to that of acquirer (Zhou, 2013; Zhou & Wan, forthcoming). In those cases, there are 
greater overlap of activities and resources that need to be combined and rationalized. Also, 
there are greater amount of activities and resources that are interrelated. 
 However, actual process of post-merger operational integration is not understood 
well. Particularly, the gap in empirical analysis is serious. Though multiple case studies have 
contributed detailed insights (e.g. Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991; Schweizer, 2005; Ranft & 
Lord, 2002; Birkinshaw et al., 2000), there are only a few empirical studies (Puranam et al., 
2006; Puranam & Srikanth, 2007; Puranam et al., 2009). As a result, very limited number of 
mechanisms (i.e. absorption of acquired organization, or “structural integration”) for 
operational integration have been examined. This study targets this gap, and examines a 
mechanism that has not been studied empirically: managerial integration. 
Managerial integration 
 Managerial integration is one of critical strategies to achieve operational integration. 
Ranft and Lord (2002) cited a comment of a target’s manager; 
I’m a firm believer that when you make an acquisition […], you need to mix it 
[top management team] up a little bit. […] You need to know what they 
[acquirer] are doing. We really don’t know that yet. We’ve had a number of 
integration meetings together, but we still don’t really understand why they do 
what they do, and they don’t know what we do. 
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In addition, there are anecdotal evidences that integration manager sent from acquirer to 
target plays central role for integration (Schweizer, 2005). Likewise, managers appointed 
from targets to acquirers not only facilitate implementation of coordination plan, but also find 
potential synergies that have not been recognized by the acquirers. 
 Upper echelon literature provides theoretical support to the argument. Managers are 
limited by bounded rationality, and their perceptions are influenced by managers’ 
interpretation of situations based on their selective perceptions, limited field of vision, and 
cognitive base and values (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1990; 
Carpenter, Geletkanycz, & Sanders, 2004). Post-merger integration context even further 
exaggerates this bounded rationality. Post-merger integration is a task in extreme uncertainty. 
Previously separated by firm boundaries, both parties do not know what partners are doing, 
what resources they have, and how they with each other. In such an uncertain context, 
managers need to rely more on their personal perceptions rather than objective information, 
and effects of TMT are manifested (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001). Based on this argument, 
managerial integration is extremely important after acquisitions. 
 And relatedness of operations of acquirer and target further magnify the necessity of 
managerial integration. The more related operations with each other, the more need for 
coordination of activities and resources (Zhou, 2013; Zhou & Wan, forthcoming). Thus, the 
level of managerial integration should be greater if business areas of acquirer and target are 
interrelated. This study examines three forms of managerial integration: dual assignment, 
transfer of managers from acquirer to target, and transfer of managers from target to acquirer. 
The first set of hypotheses are the following. 
Hypothesis 1: TMTs of an acquirer and a target are more likely to be 
integrated either by dual assignment of managers, transfer of managers down 
48 
 
to the target, or transfer of managers up from the target if their operations are 
interrelated. 
Decrease in Managerial Integration over Time 
 Since operational integration is a process rather than one-time action, an essential 
question is how integration mechanisms are managed over time. For example, Birkinshaw et 
al. (2000) reported a case where human integration paved the way to task integration. Also, 
Puranam and Srikanth (2007)argued that organizational integration contributes to leveraging 
target firm’s knowledge, but disrupts their on-going activities. These findings clearly indicate 
the significance of timing. As an integral part of integration process, managerial integration 
should be also conducted in a timely manner. 
 In this study, I hypothesize that the level of managerial integration decreases over 
time for the following reasons. First, the need for top managers’ involvement becomes lower 
as situation becomes more certain. Involvement of top managers is particularly important if 
relationships between targets and acquirers are uncertain and rapidly changing. It is because 
top managers have capability and knowledge for considering broader effects of decisions on 
entire organization, as well as authority to make decisions timely (Rajan & Wulf, 2006). As 
integration proceeds and managers and employees become better able to predict what will 
happen, the situation can be managed by managers with narrower scope of knowledge and 
responsibilities (Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012).  
Second, acquirers and targets learn how to coordinate with each other during the 
integration process (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Cyert & March, 1963). They learn routines, 
resources, and culture of each organization, and codify them as rules for coordination. Or, 
new routines can be established for coordination without codification. In any ways, personal 
coordination mechanisms can be replaced by impersonal mechanisms over time. 
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Third, top managers are more critical for nurturing group culture immediately after 
acquisition. Acquisition causes extreme uncertainty in affected organizations. Direct 
interaction with them, or even merely appearance of them helps resolve uncertainty 
substantially, and develop trust and group culture. Therefore, here posit the second set of 
hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 2: TMTs of an acquirer and a target become less likely to be 
integrated by either dual assignment of managers, transfer of managers down 
to the target, or transfer of managers up from the target as time elapses after 
acquisition. 
Continuous Effect of Relatedness 
 Though the absolute level of managerial integration decreases over time, relative level 
of integration with related target compared with unrelated target should continue to be higher 
for the following reasons. First, related targets are more likely to experience uncertainty for 
prolonged period. Because coordinating related operations is a complex task, the process 
takes longer time with trials and errors. Also, the nature of inter-relatedness requires target to 
face uncertainties originating from not only their own operational environment, but also other 
inter-related counterparts’. Under prolonged uncertainty, impersonal coordination remains 
difficult, and nurturing group culture through interaction with top managers keeps important. 
 Second, even if the level of uncertainty is similar, managers with broader scope of 
knowledge and authority are more important in coordinating with related target. Because an 
issue in the target may affect other parts of the firm, acquirers need to manage such target 
with broader managerial scope. Therefore, third set of hypotheses are the following. 
Hypothesis 3: TMTs of an acquirer and a target stay more likely to be 
integrated over time by either dual assignment of managers, transfer of 
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managers down to the target, or transfer of managers up from the target if 
their operations are interrelated. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data and Sample 
 The data of acquisitions are from Zephyr database. Zephyr is a product published by 
Bureau van Dijk, and it covers acquisitions worldwide. In addition to the comprehensive 
coverage, its strength is in its link to another database published by the same company, 
ORBIS. Because ORBIS reports names of managers of public and private firms including 
subsidiaries of firms worldwide, it allows us to create a data set about acquisition and 
managerial integration. 
 The sample is consisted of acquisitions reported by Zephyr from 2000 to 2008 for the 
analysis of managerial integration as of 2008, and from 2000 to 2010 for the analysis of 
managerial integration as of 2010. Acquisitions explained as restructuring, management buy-
out, institutional acquisitions, and the like are removed to limit the sample to those facing the 
challenge of operational integration. Also, the sample is limited to acquisitions that resulted 
in new establishments of control in a clear way. This screening is necessary to identify when 
the integration process started. For example, if an acquirer owned 60% of ownership in a 
target at time t-1, and increased the ownership share to 100% at time t, it is not clear whether 
the integration started at time t, or the target was already integrated at time t-1. The timing of 
integration is similarly unclear if an acquirer owned 30% of ownership at time t-1, and 50% 
at time t. To avoid such ambiguity, acquisitions are included in the sample if ownership of 
acquirers is below 50% before acquisitions, and above or equal to 95% after acquisitions. 
After combining information on managers from ORBIS and dropping observations without 




 The empirical model estimates the likelihood that managerial integration happens in 
each observation period. The unit of observation is acquisition-observation period, and the 
likelihood is estimated by the following linear probability model.  
𝑇𝑚,ℎ,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋ℎ + 𝛽2𝑌ℎ,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋ℎ𝑌ℎ,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑚,ℎ,𝑡 
where  𝑇𝑚,ℎ,𝑡 is a dummy variable representing the event of type m of managerial integration 
concerning acquisition h at year t. This study examines managerial integration as of 2008 and 
2010, so t is year 2008 or 2010. 𝑋ℎ is the explanatory variable in Hypothesis 1, a dummy 
variable for relatedness of business area between acquirer and target of acquisition h. And 
𝑌ℎ,𝑡 is the explanatory variable in Hypothesis 2, and signifies time elapsed since acquisition at 
time t. The interaction term  𝑋ℎ𝑌ℎ,𝑡 is the explanatory variable for Hypothesis 3. 
Variables 
 Dual assignment of manager. The first dependent variable is dual assignment of 
manager in TMTs of both acquirer and target. Lists of managers are derived from ORBIS 
disks published in early 2009 and 2011 that record information at the end of 2008 and 2010. 
This variable is one if at least one manager is recorded as a manager of acquirer as well as 
target in the same year.  
As ORBIS reports names of managers without identification codes, identical 
managers need to be found by matching names by the following steps. First, full names of 
managers are compared, and identical managers are detected if managers are matched by full 
names. Second, combinations of first and last names are compared with dropping middle 
names, and managers are identified by matching first and last names combined. This step is 
necessary because ORBIS sometimes reports middle names in addition to first and last 
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names, and comparing reported full name fails to capture the same managers when they are 
reported by the first, middle, and last names in one firm, and by only the first and last names 
in the other. Lastly, when the first name of a manager is only one letter, combination of the 
first letter of the first name and the whole last name is compared. This step allows to capture 
managers whose initial letter of the first name is reported as the first name. 
Transfer of managers down to target. This is the second dependent variable. Transfer 
of managers is defined by comparing different vintages of ORBIS disks. For example, 
transfer of managers between 2006 and 2008 is detected by comparing 2007 and 2009 
vintages that report information as of 2006 and 2008 respectively. Transfer of managers 
down to target is determined to have happened if at least one of managers of acquirer in 2006 
was not in TMT of a target in 2006, but became a member of TMT of the target in 2008. 
Managers are identified by the name matching procedure explained above. Transfer of 
managers between 2008 and 2010 is found by the same steps using ORBIS vintages of 2009 
and 2011 reporting information as of 2008 and 2010. 
Transfer of managers up from target. This third dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that is one if there is at least one manager in target in year 2006 (or 2008) was not 
included in TMT of acquirer in the same year, but became a member of it in year 2008 (or 
2010). Transfers are defined by using the same data and name matching procedure utilized 
for Transfer of managers down to target. 
 Relatedness in business area of acquirer and target. This variable is the first 
explanatory variable measuring inter-relatedness between acquirer’s and target’s operations. 
Concretely, this is a dummy variable that is one if target’s core business area is the same as 
one of business areas of acquirer. Overlap of business area is a proxy of inter-relatedness of 
the two firms’ operations for the following reasons. First, if an acquired operation is in the 
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same business area, it is likely that there are redundancies to be eliminated or gaps to be filled 
in their activities including marketing, production capacity, and product development. 
Second, it is likely that both firms can share common resources such as sales channels, 
production facilities, and components. And third, two firms operating in the same business 
area are likely to own intellectual property or technological knowledge that can be 
redeployed to the partner. Inter-relatedness in these aspects demand significant degree of 
coordination for the two firms to achieve synergy. Data of business areas are from ORBIS. 
To find the overlap, primary NAICS of target is compared with primary and secondary 
NAICS of acquirer. 
 Time elapsed since acquisition. The second explanatory variable measures the number 
of years elapsed since acquisition. This variable is greater if an acquisition is older. 
 Control variables. Several characteristics of acquisition, acquirer, and country of 
target that may be associated with managerial integration outcome are controlled.  
 Deal size of acquisition is logged value of acquisition reported by Zephyr. Although 
deal values can be influenced by competition among bidders (e.g. Giliberto & Varaiya, 
1989), they generally reflect acquired firm’s values evaluated by acquirers. Since integration 
of highly evaluated resources or operations is critical, this variable should be positively 
associated with managerial integration. 
 Acquirer size is measured by logged total asset of acquirer at each time period, and 
the data are from ORBIS. Firms grow with delegating decision-making authorities and 
functions to subordinates (Chandler, 1962; Bloom et al., 2012). As a result, larger firms 
should be more decentralized, and managerial integration is executed not at the headquarters 
of acquirers, but at a lower level of organizational hierarchy. 
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 Other financial metrics, acquirer’s ratio of liability as well as profitability are 
included. If acquirer’s financial slack is limited and they are not generating abundant cash 
flow, their behaviour might become more conservative, and managerial integration may be 
affected. These financial metrics are derived from ORBIS. 
 In addition, several country characteristics of targets are controlled. Country size of 
target is logged GDP reported by World Bank. Rule of law of target’s country is the measure 
reported by World Governance Indicators. Development of countries measured by these 
variables may directly or indirectly affect the managerial integration. For example, if a 
country is more developed, acquirers may want to develop important functions with closely 
supporting the development by managerial integrations. Or, as a result of successful 
developments of such critical functions in those countries, it may be necessary for acquirers 
to integrate them locating in developed countries.  Finally, cross-border acquisition is a 
dummy variable that is one if target’s country is different from acquirer’s. When target is in a 
foreign county, it is less likely that their operations are overlapped and require coordination 
compared with domestic acquisitions conditional on other factors being equal. Moreover, 
transfer of managers between distant locations is more costly. These factors should lead to 
lower frequency of managerial integration in cross-border acquisitions. 
Acquirers’ Industry-specific or country-specific factors that are consistent across the 
analysis period are further controlled by industry and country fixed effects. 
Table 2-1 and 2-2 show definitions, descriptive statistics, and correlations of 
variables. 
================================================= 





 Table 2-3 shows results of the regression. Likelihood of each form of managerial 
integration is estimated in each model. Coefficients of control variables show interesting 
association between acquisition characteristics and managerial integration. Deal value is 
positively related, and acquirer size is negatively related to managerial integration. They 
suggest that acquirers are making efforts to integrate and utilize important and valuable 
operation or resources of targets. However, as acquirer becomes larger, the role and 
responsibility of such integration should be delegated from TMT of acquirer to lower level of 
managers. Acquirer’s reliance on liability is negatively associated with managerial 
integration, which suggests that integration of target is an expansion strategy, and it is more 
frequently pursued by firms with financial slack. In addition, cross-border acquisitions see 
less managerial integration. Managerial integration across border is more costly, and it is 
difficult for managers of acquirers to work in TMT of foreign target. Therefore, managerial 
integration is compromised.  
================================================= 
Insert Table 2-3 about here 
================================================= 
 Model 1-3 examines Hypotheses 1 and 2. Model 1 and 3 supports the Hypotheses 1a 
and 1c respectively, that is, as business areas of acquirers and targets are interrelated, they are 
more likely to engage in managerial integration. Hypothesis 1b about transfer of managers 
down to target is not supported by insignificant coefficient. Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c are 
strongly supported by negative and highly significant coefficients of time elapsed since 
acquisition showing targets of older acquisitions are no longer integrated at as high degree as 
those of new acquisitions. Either because coordination between acquirer and target could be 
codified, or its responsibility could be delegated to lower level in the organization, TMTs of 
acquirers do not lead the integration any longer. 
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 Model 4-6 test hypothesis 3. Supporting the hypotheses, coefficients of interactions 
between managerial integration and time elapsed after acquisitions are not negative, and even 
positive in the estimation of managerial transfer to target. Taken together with the 
independent effects of managerial integration and time elapsed after acquisitions, the results 
indicate that managerial integration is greater if acquirer and target are interrelated in their 
business areas, and the greater integration continues to exist over years. The persistent effects 
of relatedness support the argument that related operations entail constant changes and 
adaptations of each other, and require continuous information processing. 
 However, coefficients for estimating managerial transfer to target call for a special 
attention since they tell a more nuanced story. Model 2 says that relatedness is not associated 
with likelihood of managerial transfers down to target in average, but with interaction term of 
relatedness and time elapsed since acquisition, the main effect of relatedness is negative and 
significant, and the interaction effect is positive and significant in Model 5. This means that 
transfer of managers to target is less frequent with related target than unrelated target 
immediately after acquisition, but it becomes more frequent over time. It is difficult to reach 
a definitive conclusion, but a possible interpretation is that transfer of managers to target is 
closely related to application of existent coordination schemes. When interrelated, designing 
coordination schemes is a complex task requiring detailed knowledge about operations of 
both organizations. As such, it takes more time to design coordination schemes, and 
application of them starts later than unrelated acquisition cases. In related acquisitions, 
acquirers learn targets’ operation to design coordination schemes first, and apply the schemes 
to targets by transferring managers later. In unrelated acquisitions, on the other hand, 
coordination schemes are much simpler, and available briefly after acquisitions, and 
managers are transferred to target to implement the coordination without spending so much 
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time for designing them. Of course, purposes of such transfer is not limited to it, but it might 
be a factor driving the result. 
Robustness Check 
 To check the robustness, I conducted multiple analyses. First, though linear 
probability model has advantage in the ease of interpretation, non-linear estimation models 
are preferred by some studies. Thus, to check the robustness to a non-linear estimation model, 
conditional logit model is adopted with the same variables. Fixed effect for acquirers’ 
industry-country interaction is adopted. The results are shown in Table 2-4. Coefficients are 
consistent with the main results. 
 Second, as the sample includes broad range of industries, the results may be industry 
specific. To examine industry variations, I split the sample into four industry categories, 
manufacturing, distribution, service, and others, and run the same regression for each 
subsample. Results in Table 2-5 shows weaker, but generally consistent results. Notably, 
service provider acquirers behave most consistently while distributor acquirers do not seem to 
be influenced by relatedness. This may be because distribution activities are so much 
standardized and codified that coordination of related operations would not require so much 
interactions between the two parties.  
 Third, the main analysis examines managerial integration in 2008 and 2010, and 
financial crisis in 2008-2009 might affect managerial integration in 2010 much more than 
2008. Main analysis included a dummy variable to control this effect. But to examine further, 
I split the sample by year, and check managerial integration in each year separately. Results 
in Table 2-6 show similar associations in both years. 
================================================= 





This study examined managerial integration between acquirers and targets after 
acquisitions to understand the post-merger integration process. Empirical analysis found that 
the relatedness between acquirer and target leads to greater managerial integration, and 
though the level of managerial integration becomes lower over time, the association between 
the relatedness and managerial integration remains.  
These findings provide the first empirical evidence about the importance of 
managerial integration after acquisitions. As previous studies on post-merger integration 
process argued, ownership integration is not enough for operational integration. Adopting 
integration mechanisms like transfers of managers, firms are actively developing operational 
integration acquisitions.  
Another contribution of this study is that the change of integration process over time 
is documented. Most of studies on post-merger integration were limited in their observation 
period, and they did not examine how integration mechanisms stay in place, get modified, 
and get removed over time. This study finds that managerial integration is gradually removed 
over time.  
An interesting, though not fully explained, finding is that between inter-related 
acquirers and targets, transfers down to the targets are less common than in other cases 
immediately after acquisitions, but they become more frequent later (Model 5). One possible 
interpretation is that a major purpose of transfers down to targets is executing and monitoring 
coordination, and if operations of acquirers and targets are interrelated, it is difficult to 
determine plans for coordination. Therefore, acquirers of related acquisitions spend some 
time to develop coordination plans before executing the plans with managerial transfer 
59 
 
whereas acquirers of unrelated acquisitions execute simple coordination plans (e.g. 
introduction of reporting formats) immediately after acquisitions. However, this paper leaves 
the test of this hypothesis for future study. 
A limitation of this study is that the nature of acquisitions is not specified. In 
exchange for the large sample size, detailed information about acquisition deals were not 
available. Future study may collect more detailed information of deals (e.g. purpose of 




Table 2-1: Definitions and summary statistics of variables 
  
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Definition
Simultaneous assignment 36,632      0.375 0.484 0 1 Dummy variable that is one if at least one manager is a TMT member of both acquirer and target
Transfer down to target 28,597      0.122 0.328 0 1 Dummy variable that is one if at least one manager of target is newly included in TMT of acquirer
Transfer up from target 28,597      0.057 0.231 0 1 Dummy variable that is one if at least one manager of acquirer is newly included in TMT of target
Deal size 15,353      9.982 2.220 -0.315 17.828 Logged deal value in thousand EUR
Acquirer size 36,629      12.876 2.514 2.398 20.497 Logged total asset of acqurier in thousand USD
Acquirer ratio of liability 36,467      0.621 0.356 0 24.931 Liability over total asset of acquirer
Acquirer profitability 36,632      0.100 0.100 -0.300 0.790 EBITDA over total asset of acquirer
Country size of target 36,345      14.430 1.419 7.813 16.545 Logged GDP of target's country
Rule of law of target 36,628      1.503 0.558 -1.207 1.977 Rule of law of target's country
Cross-border acquisition 36,632      0.305 0.460 0 1 Dummy variable for cross-border acquisition
Time elasped since acquisition 36,632      3.450 2.488 0 10 Number of years elasped since acquisition










Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1 Simultaneous assignment 1
2 Transfer down to target 0.350 1
3 Transfer up from target 0.225 0.057 1
4 Deal size -0.094 0.032 0.114 1
5 Acquirer size -0.279 -0.054 0.034 0.653 1
6 Acquirer ratio of liability -0.011 -0.026 -0.010 0.014 0.012 1
7 Acquirer profitability -0.066 -0.027 -0.009 0.113 0.223 -0.037 1
8 Country size of target -0.027 0.077 0.052 0.254 0.175 -0.007 0.040 1
9 Rule of law of target 0.158 0.045 0.012 -0.022 -0.130 -0.019 -0.056 0.079 1
10 Cross-border acquisition -0.295 -0.115 -0.045 0.132 0.232 -0.043 0.059 -0.172 -0.048 1
11 Time elasped since acquisition -0.063 -0.157 -0.042 0.041 0.073 0.004 0.030 0.084 0.061 0.009 1
12 Relatedness 0.036 0.016 0.038 0.128 0.069 -0.013 0.008 0.014 0.012 -0.020 0.021 1
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Table 2-3: Main results 
  
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6












Deal size 0.0397** 0.0167** 0.0165** 0.0398** 0.0168** 0.0164**
(18.02) (8.97) (11.90) (18.04) (9.02) (11.89)
Acquirer size -0.0476** -0.0184** -0.00972** -0.0476** -0.0184** -0.00973**
(-21.11) (-9.51) (-6.73) (-21.10) (-9.50) (-6.74)
Acquirer ratio of liability -0.0350** -0.0215* 0.00139 -0.0351** -0.0217* 0.00142
(-3.42) (-2.47) (0.21) (-3.42) (-2.49) (0.21)
Acquirer profitability -0.0237 0.00352 -0.0206 -0.0229 0.00356 -0.0206
(-0.62) (0.19) (-1.48) (-0.60) (0.20) (-1.49)
Country size of target -0.0485** 0.0127** -0.00230 -0.0485** 0.0128** -0.00229
(-13.15) (3.89) (-0.94) (-13.15) (3.90) (-0.94)
Rule of law of target 0.0744** 0.00633 0.00710 0.0744** 0.00647 0.00706
(7.27) (0.74) (1.08) (7.27) (0.75) (1.08)
Cross-border acquisition -0.231** -0.0599** -0.0352** -0.231** -0.0596** -0.0353**
(-26.42) (-8.04) (-6.39) (-26.40) (-8.01) (-6.40)
Year 2010 0.0393** -0.0376** -0.00750 0.0393** -0.0376** -0.00751
(5.15) (-5.83) (-1.56) (5.16) (-5.84) (-1.56)
Relatedness 0.0289** 0.00157 0.0113* 0.0130 -0.0247* 0.0180*
(3.92) (0.25) (2.43) (0.94) (-2.03) (1.97)
Time elasped since acquisition -0.0106** -0.0194** -0.00444** -0.0125** -0.0224** -0.00365**
(-6.55) (-14.39) (-4.41) (-5.81) (-12.37) (-2.69)
Relatedness x Time elasped 0.00396 0.00618* -0.00158
(1.36) (2.51) (-0.86)
Acquirer's country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer's industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
r2_a_within 0.101 0.0515 0.0191 0.101 0.0519 0.0191
N 15187 11998 13084 15187 11998 13084
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.1,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01"
Likelihood of three forms of managerial integration are estimated by linear probability model with 
fixed effects for acquirer's country and industry.
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Table 2-4: Robustness check by adopting conditional logit model 
 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12












Deal size 0.256** 0.182** 0.306** 0.256** 0.184** 0.305**
(16.65) (7.93) (10.88) (16.68) (8.00) (10.85)
Acquirer size -0.291** -0.193** -0.205** -0.291** -0.192** -0.205**
(-18.25) (-7.96) (-6.91) (-18.25) (-7.90) (-6.92)
Acquirer ratio of liability -0.123* -0.260* -0.00651 -0.123* -0.253+ -0.00665
(-2.11) (-1.97) (-0.06) (-2.12) (-1.93) (-0.06)
Acquirer profitability -0.156 -0.0305 -0.0805 -0.148 -0.0366 -0.0830
(-0.64) (-0.13) (-0.37) (-0.61) (-0.15) (-0.38)
Country size of target -0.320** 0.124** -0.110* -0.321** 0.124* -0.109*
(-11.51) (2.58) (-2.13) (-11.54) (2.57) (-2.11)
Rule of law of target 0.683** 0.291+ 0.598** 0.683** 0.293+ 0.597**
(7.03) (1.74) (3.03) (7.02) (1.75) (3.03)
Cross-border acquisition -1.379** -0.723** -0.649** -1.379** -0.722** -0.649**
(-21.70) (-6.93) (-5.22) (-21.69) (-6.89) (-5.22)
Year 2010 0.208** -0.355** -0.101 0.208** -0.354** -0.101
(4.44) (-5.05) (-1.22) (4.46) (-5.02) (-1.22)
Relatedness 0.198** -0.00372 0.182* 0.0423 -0.427** 0.287+
(4.19) (-0.05) (2.09) (0.48) (-3.34) (1.75)
Time elasped since acquisition -0.0579** -0.221** -0.0482* -0.0774** -0.287** -0.0342
(-5.59) (-13.04) (-2.55) (-5.54) (-11.80) (-1.29)
Relatedness x Time elasped 0.0383* 0.120** -0.0257
(2.09) (3.95) (-0.76)
Acquirer country x industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -5548.3 -2668.2 -1896.9 -5546.1 -2660.3 -1896.6
N 12105 8173 7816 12105 8173 7816
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01"
Likelihood of three forms of managerial integration are estimated by conditional logit model with fixed effects 
for acquirer's country by industry.
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Table 2-5: Robustness check by splitting sample by industry 
  
Model 13 Model 14 Model 15 Model 16 Model 17 Model 18 Model 19 Model 20 Model 21 Model 22 Model 23 Model 24
Sample Manufacturer acquirers Distributor acquirers
























Deal size 0.0381** 0.0176** 0.0158** 0.0383** 0.0178** 0.0158** 0.0494** 0.0162** 0.0179** 0.0497** 0.0163** 0.0180**
(10.57) (5.79) (6.51) (10.63) (5.84) (6.53) (7.68) (2.83) (4.49) (7.73) (2.84) (4.51)
Acquirer size -0.0507** -0.0157** -0.0142** -0.0509** -0.0158** -0.0142** -0.0439** -0.0155* -0.0153** -0.0434** -0.0154* -0.0152**
(-13.43) (-4.78) (-5.42) (-13.46) (-4.81) (-5.43) (-6.37) (-2.46) (-3.42) (-6.30) (-2.44) (-3.39)
Acquirer ratio of liability -0.0698** -0.0780** 0.00744 -0.0705** -0.0790** 0.00703 -0.00581 -0.0413 -0.0415 -0.00505 -0.0410 -0.0411
(-2.97) (-3.32) (0.40) (-3.00) (-3.36) (0.37) (-0.12) (-0.87) (-1.23) (-0.10) (-0.86) (-1.22)
Acquirer profitability -0.171** -0.0287 0.0259 -0.170** -0.0293 0.0257 0.281* 0.0876 -0.00223 0.282* 0.0872 -0.00230
(-2.61) (-0.80) (0.89) (-2.60) (-0.82) (0.88) (2.05) (0.94) (-0.03) (2.06) (0.94) (-0.03)
Country size of target -0.0586** 0.0102* -0.00588 -0.0585** 0.0102* -0.00590 -0.0504** 0.0244* -0.000674 -0.0507** 0.0243* -0.000760
(-11.20) (2.22) (-1.60) (-11.18) (2.22) (-1.61) (-4.30) (2.24) (-0.09) (-4.32) (2.22) (-0.10)
Rule of law of target 0.0821** 0.00987 0.0119 0.0819** 0.00994 0.0119 0.1000** 0.0250 0.00550 0.101** 0.0250 0.00546
(5.72) (0.84) (1.23) (5.71) (0.84) (1.23) (3.24) (0.93) (0.29) (3.27) (0.92) (0.29)
Cross-border acquisition -0.238** -0.0581** -0.0401** -0.237** -0.0575** -0.0399** -0.259** -0.0874** -0.0341* -0.259** -0.0876** -0.0341*
(-17.56) (-5.04) (-4.38) (-17.49) (-4.99) (-4.36) (-9.65) (-3.65) (-2.04) (-9.65) (-3.65) (-2.04)
Year 2010 0.0204+ -0.0292** -0.00437 0.0204+ -0.0293** -0.00435 0.0609** -0.0325+ -0.00487 0.0612** -0.0326+ -0.00493
(1.68) (-2.80) (-0.52) (1.68) (-2.80) (-0.52) (2.81) (-1.69) (-0.36) (2.83) (-1.69) (-0.36)
Relatedness 0.0266* 0.00246 0.0132 -0.0138 -0.0254 -0.00122 0.00804 0.0202 0.000127 -0.0507 0.00594 -0.0121
(2.22) (0.24) (1.63) (-0.60) (-1.26) (-0.08) (0.37) (1.06) (0.01) (-1.24) (0.16) (-0.45)
Time elasped since acquisition 0.00288 -0.0122** -0.00139 -0.00124 -0.0150** -0.00282 -0.0144** -0.0191** -0.00518+ -0.0214** -0.0208** -0.00658+
(1.13) (-5.71) (-0.81) (-0.38) (-5.47) (-1.28) (-2.98) (-4.51) (-1.73) (-3.37) (-3.67) (-1.65)
Relatedness x Time elasped 0.00976* 0.00631 0.00324 0.0147+ 0.00336 0.00288
(2.08) (1.60) (1.03) (1.69) (0.43) (0.53)
Industry x country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted within R square 0.126 0.0398 0.0172 0.126 0.0402 0.0172 0.0964 0.0461 0.0173 0.0973 0.0455 0.0168
N 5437 4118 4530 5437 4118 4530 1888 1511 1628 1888 1511 1628
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01
Likelihood of three forms of managerial integration are estimated by linear probability model with fixed 
effects for acquirer's country and industry.
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Table 2-5 (continued) 
  
Model 25 Model 26 Model 27 Model 28 Model 29 Model 30 Model 31 Model 32 Model 33 Model 34 Model 35 Model 36
Sample Service provider acquirers Other acquirers
























Deal size 0.0397** 0.0182** 0.0168** 0.0398** 0.0183** 0.0168** 0.0420** 0.0164** 0.0184** 0.0421** 0.0170** 0.0182**
(10.10) (5.38) (7.18) (10.11) (5.38) (7.17) (8.09) (3.95) (5.61) (8.11) (4.08) (5.54)
Acquirer size -0.0522** -0.0215** -0.00768** -0.0522** -0.0214** -0.00772** -0.0422** -0.0195** -0.00439 -0.0422** -0.0193** -0.00455
(-13.53) (-6.44) (-3.31) (-13.54) (-6.44) (-3.33) (-7.36) (-4.10) (-1.16) (-7.35) (-4.06) (-1.20)
Acquirer ratio of liability -0.0326** -0.0147 -0.00462 -0.0326** -0.0146 -0.00479 -0.0352 -0.0226 -0.00158 -0.0362 -0.0288 0.00157
(-2.59) (-1.27) (-0.56) (-2.59) (-1.26) (-0.58) (-0.92) (-0.66) (-0.06) (-0.95) (-0.84) (0.06)
Acquirer profitability 0.0819 0.0127 -0.0547** 0.0806 0.0130 -0.0553** -0.0446 0.0247 -0.000753 -0.0426 0.0226 0.000504
(1.33) (0.45) (-2.70) (1.31) (0.46) (-2.73) (-0.50) (0.70) (-0.03) (-0.47) (0.64) (0.02)
Country size of target -0.0474** 0.00885 0.000373 -0.0474** 0.00889 0.000358 -0.0224* 0.0148 0.00126 -0.0221* 0.0160+ 0.000707
(-6.38) (1.28) (0.08) (-6.37) (1.29) (0.08) (-2.09) (1.61) (0.17) (-2.05) (1.74) (0.10)
Rule of law of target 0.0713** 0.00921 -0.00340 0.0708** 0.00949 -0.00388 0.0512* -0.0110 0.00699 0.0506* -0.0123 0.00761
(2.95) (0.44) (-0.23) (2.93) (0.45) (-0.26) (2.04) (-0.54) (0.43) (2.01) (-0.60) (0.47)
Cross-border acquisition -0.238** -0.0577** -0.0254** -0.238** -0.0576** -0.0255** -0.188** -0.0652** -0.0513** -0.188** -0.0646** -0.0519**
(-15.16) (-4.19) (-2.71) (-15.17) (-4.19) (-2.72) (-8.00) (-3.45) (-3.43) (-7.99) (-3.43) (-3.47)
Year 2010 0.0560** -0.0445** -0.0117 0.0560** -0.0445** -0.0117 0.0388* -0.0385** -0.00687 0.0392* -0.0380* -0.00729
(4.13) (-3.87) (-1.48) (4.13) (-3.87) (-1.47) (2.13) (-2.58) (-0.58) (2.15) (-2.55) (-0.62)
Relatedness 0.0472** -0.00312 0.0177* 0.0596* -0.0113 0.0309* 0.0208 0.00555 0.00333 -0.00998 -0.0698* 0.0403+
(3.69) (-0.29) (2.34) (2.50) (-0.53) (2.09) (1.14) (0.37) (0.28) (-0.30) (-2.42) (1.75)
Time elasped since acquisition -0.0228** -0.0294** -0.00596** -0.0212** -0.0304** -0.00435+ -0.0141** -0.0154** -0.00657** -0.0186** -0.0258** -0.00144
(-7.89) (-12.06) (-3.52) (-5.44) (-9.16) (-1.89) (-3.62) (-4.88) (-2.62) (-3.27) (-5.56) (-0.39)
Relatedness x Time elasped -0.00324 0.00200 -0.00323 0.00758 0.0174** -0.00859+
(-0.62) (0.45) (-1.04) (1.09) (3.05) (-1.87)
Industry x country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted within R square 0.107 0.0725 0.0222 0.107 0.0724 0.0222 0.0686 0.0441 0.0221 0.0687 0.0479 0.0232
N 5054 4101 4527 5054 4101 4527 2796 2255 2386 2796 2255 2386
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01
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Table 2-6: Robustness check by splitting sample by year 
  
Model 37 Model 38 Model 39 Model 40 Model 41 Model 42 Model 43 Model 44 Model 45 Model 46 Model 47 Model 48
Sample Managerial integration as of 2008 Managerial integration as of 2010
























Deal size 0.0375** 0.0154** 0.0211** 0.0376** 0.0154** 0.0211** 0.0429** 0.0174** 0.0124** 0.0429** 0.0175** 0.0124**
(12.52) (5.09) (9.71) (12.54) (5.10) (9.71) (12.96) (7.63) (6.90) (12.96) (7.68) (6.89)
Acquirer size -0.0465** -0.0262** -0.0120** -0.0465** -0.0262** -0.0120** -0.0506** -0.0111** -0.00816** -0.0506** -0.0111** -0.00817**
(-15.08) (-8.46) (-5.34) (-15.07) (-8.44) (-5.35) (-14.96) (-4.64) (-4.30) (-14.95) (-4.64) (-4.30)
Acquirer ratio of liability -0.0375** -0.0280* -0.00423 -0.0378** -0.0281* -0.00423 -0.0304+ -0.0142 -0.00505 -0.0304+ -0.0144 -0.00505
(-2.93) (-2.15) (-0.44) (-2.95) (-2.15) (-0.44) (-1.74) (-1.01) (-0.45) (-1.74) (-1.02) (-0.45)
Acquirer profitability 0.00788 0.000416 -0.0491* 0.00897 0.000523 -0.0492* -0.0189 -0.00417 0.00862 -0.0187 -0.00419 0.00860
(0.16) (0.01) (-2.11) (0.18) (0.02) (-2.11) (-0.31) (-0.19) (0.49) (-0.31) (-0.20) (0.49)
Country size of target -0.0543** 0.00655 -0.00444 -0.0543** 0.00656 -0.00443 -0.0423** 0.0155** -0.000482 -0.0423** 0.0155** -0.000470
(-10.64) (1.11) (-1.05) (-10.64) (1.11) (-1.04) (-7.80) (4.16) (-0.16) (-7.80) (4.16) (-0.16)
Rule of law of target 0.0802** 0.0283* 0.0168 0.0803** 0.0284* 0.0168 0.0733** -0.0152 -0.00156 0.0733** -0.0150 -0.00161
(5.53) (1.98) (1.59) (5.54) (1.99) (1.59) (4.94) (-1.47) (-0.19) (4.94) (-1.45) (-0.19)
Cross-border acquisition -0.222** -0.0555** -0.0353** -0.222** -0.0556** -0.0353** -0.239** -0.0595** -0.0367** -0.239** -0.0590** -0.0368**
(-18.75) (-4.46) (-3.92) (-18.74) (-4.46) (-3.92) (-18.16) (-6.62) (-5.23) (-18.15) (-6.56) (-5.25)
Year 2010 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.) (.)
Relatedness 0.0247* -0.00971 0.0152* 0.00808 -0.0190 0.0175 0.0342** 0.0119 0.00783 0.0273 -0.0211 0.0145
(2.47) (-0.97) (2.09) (0.47) (-1.08) (1.37) (3.08) (1.57) (1.30) (1.07) (-1.20) (1.04)
Time elasped since acquisition-0.00892** -0.0400** -0.00481** -0.0115** -0.0414** -0.00445+ -0.0120** -0.00388* -0.00420** -0.0127** -0.00705** -0.00355*
(-3.98) (-17.94) (-2.98) (-3.70) (-13.23) (-1.95) (-5.10) (-2.41) (-3.27) (-3.93) (-3.18) (-2.01)
Relatedness x Time elasped 0.00519 0.00278 -0.000691 0.00139 0.00657* -0.00134
(1.18) (0.64) (-0.22) (0.30) (2.09) (-0.53)
Acquirer's country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Acquirer's industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted within R square 0.0971 0.0863 0.0252 0.0971 0.0862 0.0250 0.106 0.0240 0.0127 0.106 0.0245 0.0126
N 8233 5482 5884 8233 5482 5884 6911 6464 7149 6911 6464 7149
t statistics in parentheses
+ p<0.1,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01"
Likelihood of three forms of managerial integration are estimated by linear probability model with fixed 










This study examines how firms control and coordinate their subsidiaries through holding 
companies (HCs) by studying assignments and transfers of managers between the headquarters 
(HQ) and subsidiaries. Main arguments are two-fold. First, control and coordination (CC) have 
two facets: design and revision of CC schemes, and application of the CC schemes. The pattern 
of managerial assignments and transfers reflects the role of subsidiaries in relation to these two 
facets of CC. Second, HC structure, by specializing in a certain activities and being assigned 
well-defined authority over them, changes allocation of the roles in relation to the two facets 
of CC within firms in the following ways. 1) HC, as the centre of HC group, is more tightly 
controlled and coordinated by the HQ (in the both facets of CC), 2) subordinates of HC are less 
controlled and coordinated by the HQ (at least in the facet of designing CC scheme), and 3) 
HC and its subordinates become less controlled and coordinated by the HQ (in the both facets 
of CC) during financial crisis because HC structure enables the HQ to save managerial 
resources by delegation. Data on assignments and transfers of managers within listed firms 
worldwide support the arguments. The refined understanding of CC enables this study to 




 Adopting hierarchy, firms control and coordinate variety of operations (e.g. Rajan & 
Zingales, 2001; Bloom, Sadun, & Van Reenen, 2012; Zhou, 2013). However, implementing 
effective control and coordination (CC) is a challenging task since each subunit of the firm 
faces differentiated environments (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967), competitive market demands 
intensive coordination (Ghoshal & Bartlett, 1990), firms should adapt to rapidly changing 
environment (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997), and the cognitive capacity of top management 
team is limited (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 1997).  
 This study examines the role of holding companies (HCs) in controlling and 
coordinating hierarchical organizations. A HC is an intermediary subsidiary (Birkinshaw, 
Braunerhjelm, Holm, & Terjesen, 2006; Zhou, 2015) that controls a group of subsidiaries 
specialized in a certain area. The specialization can be defined by geography, product line or 
brand, or function. As is explained in detail later, HCs facilitate CC by the headquarters (HQ) 
in a way that cannot be defined simply as centralization nor decentralization (Bloom, Sadun, 
& Van Reenen, 2010; Bloom et al., 2012). In a sense, HCs promote centralization and 
decentralization at the same time. 
 Empirically, CC is analysed by examining three forms of managerial integration 
between HQ and a subsidiary: 1) dual assignment of a manager in both HQ and a subsidiary, 
2) transfer of a manager from HQ to a subsidiary (down to a subsidiary), and 3) transfer of a 
manager from a subsidiary to HQ (up from a subsidiary). While dual assignment implies 
operational integration in general, transfer of a manager in the two different directions 
suggests more nuanced relationships. Because transfer of managers entails transfer of 
knowledge (Boeker, 1997; Williams, Chen, & Agarwal, forthcoming; Song, Almeida, & Wu, 
2003), the direction of managerial transfer signifies the direction of knowledge transfer, and 
the use of knowledge at destination organization. This is an essential element for developing 
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a refined concept of CC, and understanding the nuanced relationships between HQ and 
subsidiaries. 
 To develop hypotheses corresponding to the two directions of managerial transfer, it 
is necessary to unpack the concept of CC. There are two facets of CC: one is designing or 
revising schemes of CC, and the other is applying the schemes to implement CC. Transfer of 
managers up from a subsidiary is likely to happen if the following two conditions are met: 1) 
CC scheme is designed at HQ, and 2) the design requires local knowledge that is inter-related 
with other knowledge from other part of organization. Unless the both conditions are 
satisfied, transfer of managers from a subsidiary to HQ is not instrumental. On the other 
hand, transfer of managers from HQ to a subsidiary (down to a subsidiary) happens for 
broader reasons including applying available CC schemes, learning local knowledge that may 
or may not be inter-related with other part of organization. 
 Empirical analysis provides the following findings. If a subsidiary is a HC, the 
subsidiary is more likely to be integrated by all the three forms of managerial integration. 
More interestingly, if a subsidiary is owned by a HC (subordinates of HC), the subsidiary is 
more likely to see dual assignment, and transfer of a manger down to the subsidiary, but less 
likely to see transfer of a manager up from the subsidiary. These results support hypotheses 
based on the understanding of CC mentioned above. Namely, 1) HCs accomplish high level 
of integration among HC and subordinates of HC (HC group) with consistent application of 
CC schemes. 2) At the same time, subordinates of HC become less inter-related with 
subsidiaries out of HC group, and 3) HC group as a whole remains inter-related with others.  
In addition, 4) during financial crisis, both HCs and subsidiaries of HCs are not particularly 
more integrated by HQ. 
This study contributes to our knowledge on hierarchical organization by refining the 
concept of CC. CC is a critical mechanism to understand the firm (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
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Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1987; Grant, 1996; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig Jr, 1976), but it has 
been understood either too broadly or too narrowly. Strategy literature, on one hand, 
conceptualizes CC broadly as a mechanism to “achieving unity” (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; 
Zhou, 2013) without entangling the mechanism further. On the other hand, researches in 
economics (Aghion, Bloom, & Van Reenen, 2014 for a review) emphasize the use of local 
information based on contract theory, and do not explain the implementation of coordination. 
This study provides a more comprehensive as well as articulated view of CC by examining 
the pattern of managerial assignments and transfers. 
 In addition, the role of HC in relation to CC is presented. Though HC is a prevalent 
business practice with significant implications, there are not many studies on it to date. And 
when it is studied, researches (Benito, Lunnan, & Tomassen, 2011; Birkinshaw et al., 2006; 
Laamanen, Simula, & Torstila, 2012; Baaij & Slangen, 2013) are driven mainly by empirical 
interest in their location choices without arguing its role in organization enough. One reason 
why HC has not been studied and understood well may be the limitation in data availability, 
but another reason could be that understanding about its role has not been developed enough. 
Once characteristics of HC are understood, more study would be done to develop our 
knowledge on the important organizational mechanisms. 
 Furthermore, from a more practical viewpoint, this study suggests HC as a mechanism 
for CC. Previous studies argued integrator roles (Mohrman, 1993; Stan & Puranam, 
forthcoming), allocation of supervisory roles (Zhou, 2015), and group identities (Kogut & 
Zander, 1996; Dyer & Nobeoka, 2000) as mechanisms for CC. HC is an addition to these. 
 The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section develops hypotheses 
with theoretically understanding HC structure and transfer of managers, and refining the 
concept of CC. The following section explains empirical analysis to test the hypotheses, and 
the last section concludes. 
71 
 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Control and Coordination 
 Control and coordination (CC) is a process of achieving unity of tasks done by 
subunits of organization (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976). Standard 
response to the demand for CC is hierarchy (Chandler, 1962; Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1987; Rajan 
& Wulf, 2006). In a hierarchical organization, supervisory agent such as HQ oversights 
related operations of its subordinates, and control and coordinate them (Zhou, 2013).  
 However, CC is challenging in practice for the following reasons. First, each tasks are 
highly differentiated in terms of its environment (e.g. market demand) and its goal (e.g. 
annual sales target, lean production, and basic research for future products). As tasks are 
more differentiated from each other, CC is more difficult (Lawrence & Lorsch, 1967). 
Second, demand for CC has become greater as firms grow larger and more internationalized 
(Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1987). Third, subunits are not only differentiated, but also dynamically 
changing (Teece et al., 1997; Helfat, 1997). And lastly, top management teams (TMTs) are 
limited in their scope of attention and cognitive capacity and perspective (Hambrick & 
Mason, 1984; Ocasio, 1997). 
Holding Company Structure 
 To tackle the challenge of effective CC, firms adopt variety of devices (Van de Ven et 
al., 1976). First, decentralization of CC not only release HQ from cognitive or physical 
burden, but also improves the use of local knowledge available at each business unit (Bloom 
et al., 2010, 2012; Grant, 1996). Second, personal interactions through group conferences 
across subunits or transfer of personnel facilitate communication and socialization among 
people related to CC (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). Third, integrator role including teams for 
information sharing not only promotes inter-unit information flows, but also ameliorates 
superstitious learning (Stan & Puranam, forthcoming; Young-Hyman, 2016; Dyer & 
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Nobeoka, 2000). And forth, shared group culture is another important mechanism for 
knowledge flow and CC (Bartlett & Ghosbal, 1987; Kogut & Zander, 1996) 
 HC is an additional mechanism facilitating CC. HCs are intermediary agents 
(Birkinshaw et al., 2006; Zhou, 2015) characterised by their controlling subordinates in 
certain specific activities. The specialization can be by geography (e.g. Toyota Motor 
Europe), by product line (e.g. Moet Hennessy of LVMH group), or by function (e.g. Repsol 
International Finance). Such specialization contributes to improved managerial attention and 
results in greater integration among HC and its subordinates (HC group). Also, as the centre 
of grouped operation, HC is closely integrated by HQ. And lastly, being grouped by 
specialization, subordinates of HC are less inter-related with subsidiaries out of HC group. 
Figure 1 conceptually summarize these three characteristics of HC structure. 
================================================= 
Insert Figure 3-1 about here 
================================================= 
Transfer of Managers and Two Facets of Control and Coordination 
 Transfer of managers is a crucial mechanisms for CC. It provides managers with 
opportunities to learn local operations on-site (e.g. Schweizer, 2005; Ranft & Lord, 2002). 
Also, it promotes socialization among managers and nurtures common group culture as well 
as shared goals (Aoki, 1990). In addition, transfer of personnel involves transfer of tacit 
knowledge that requires repeated interactions and strong ties otherwise (Hansen, 1999; Song 
et al., 2003). At the TMT level in particular, transfer of managers change the scope and 
perception of TMTs, and lead to renewal of strategy (Boeker, 1997). In sum, transfer of 
managers facilitates CC by learning by managers, socialization, knowledge transfer, and 
renewed perception of managers. Though these arguments explain the association between 




 Answering the question about the direction hinges on understanding CC. CC is 
broadly defined as a process of achieving unity of operations in strategy literature. Though 
there are several attempts to theoretically articulate the concept, for instance, by 
distinguishing characteristics of knowledge required for CC (Grant, 1996), number of people 
organizing CC (Van de Ven et al., 1976), and existence of formal authority (Young-Hyman, 
2016), they are not useful for understanding the direction of managerial transfer.  
This study argues that there are two facets of CC. One is generating scheme of CC. 
Scheme of CC is a plan for CC on the issues such as each subunit’s scope of activities, rules 
of interactions among subunits, and authorities that resolve unexpected problems. It includes 
broad mechanisms from impersonal to personal and group-oriented, from those without 
communications (e.g. pre-planned rules and routines) to those requiring communication (e.g. 
group problem solving). On designing CC scheme, managers need to understand operation of 
subunits. The operations of subunits are either more inter-related with those of other subunits 
(group 1), or less inter-related with them (group 2).Transfer of managers up from a subsidiary 
helps designing CC schemes only with group 1.  
The other facet of CC is application of available CC scheme. Once CC scheme is 
designed or if CC scheme is already available, CC is accomplished by applying it. At this 
phase, CC is local adjustments of schemes and monitoring of implementations, and it is done 
at each subunits. It leads to transfer of managers down to subsidiaries, but not so much 
transfer up from subsidiaries. 
This distinction of CC mechanisms corresponds to a well-established distinction 
between CC by plan and CC by feedback (March & Simon, 1958). When a superior agent or 
manager controls and coordinates subordinate organizations, a simple way of CC is applying 
a pre-planned scheme. However, as managers are not perfectly rational and informed, 
effective CC by them often requires on-going communication with subordinate organizations 
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to update their knowledge (Edström & Galbraith, 1977). In CC by plan, application of CC 
scheme is the main tasks while generation of CC scheme is relatively an easy task. In CC by 
feedback, on the other hand, designing CC scheme requires a lot of investigations of and 
communications with subordinate organizations. Therefore, designing CC schemes is a 
significant work in addition to their applications. 
In summary, while transfer of managers down to subsidiaries happens both for 
designing and applying CC schemes, transfer of managers up from subsidiaries happens 
mainly for designing CC schemes of highly inter-related subunits. Table 3-1 summarizes the 
relationships between the characteristics of CC and relevant direction of managerial transfers. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 3-1 about here 
================================================= 
Based on these arguments, three sets of hypotheses are developed. The first set of 
hypotheses are related to managerial integration and transfer between HQ and HC. As 
explained above, HC is responsible for operations of HC group as a whole. To be an 
intermediary agent that is responsible for such a sizable group of operation, HC is a crucial 
point of CC. Therefore, HQ and HC are more likely to be integrated by dual assignment of 
managers and by transfer of managers down to subsidiaries to facilitate effective CC. In 
addition, since operation of HC group as a whole should be inter-related with operations of 
other subsidiaries (e.g. through budget allocation across divisions), transfer of knowledge 
from HC is useful for designing CC schemes. Therefore, transfer up from HC should happen 
more frequently than from other subsidiaries, too. 
Hypothesis 1: If a subsidiary is a HC, dual assignment of managers/ transfer 
of managers down from the HQ/ transfer of managers up from the subsidiary 
to the HQ is more likely to happen 
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The second set of hypotheses are about managerial integration and transfer between 
HQ and subordinates of HC. A feature of HC structure is that the roles and activities of HC 
subordinates are well specified. As a result, application of CC schemes is less costly because 
their well-specified roles and activities enables standardization and formalization of CC 
schemes that are applied to HC subordinates. At the same time, HC structure facilitates 
designing CC schemes, and enables it without intensive knowledge transfer from 
subordinates of HC.  
Reflecting the characteristics of CC concerning HC subordinates, transfer of 
managers shows distinctive patterns. Ease of CC scheme applications leads to greater 
frequencies of dual assignment and transfer down to subsidiaries of managers. In addition, 
ease of CC scheme design results in less transfer of managers up from subsidiaries. 
Hypothesis 2a: The likelihood of dual assignment of a manager to both the 
HQ and a subsidiary is greater if the subsidiary is a subordinate of an HC 
Hypothesis 2b: The likelihood of transfer of a manager down from the HQ is 
greater if the subsidiary is a subordinate of an HC 
Hypothesis 2c: The likelihood of transfer of a manager up from a subsidiary is 
lesser if the subsidiary is a subordinate of an HC 
Impact of Financial Crisis 
 Financial crisis is a significant disruption to operation of firms, and it changes the 
priority of management. Facing limited liquidity in the capital market and drastic fall in 
market demand, survival becomes an urgent goal. Even if a firm holds enough financial 
slack, disruption in value chains caused by exit of some intermediate firms may pose an 
emergent challenge. In addition, uncertainty in future demand may force firms to become 
much more conservative in their strategy (Singh & Mahmood). 
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 Under such a situation, firms utilize their limited capacity of attention for urgent 
matters for survival including financial liquidity, business portfolio restructuring, and top 
management leadership. CC is, in turn, done by more simplified and impersonal mechanisms 
such as formalized rule, fixed financial budget, or established routines at the time. Managerial 
integration and transfer are less frequent during crisis. 
 In this context of HQ’s focusing on urgent issues, HC plays a unique role. With clear 
definition of its scope and responsibility, HC group can be managed with less intervention of 
HQ. Accordingly, decrease in managerial integration and transfer between HQ and HC as 
well as subordinates of HC is greater than other subsidiaries during financial crisis. 
Hypothesis 3: The likelihood of dual assignment to both the HQ and a 
subordinate, transfer down from the HQ to a subsidiary, transfer up from a 
subsidiary to the HQ is decreased during financial crisis if the subsidiary is an 
HC or a subordinate of an HC  
 Overall, HC facilitates CC in a way that is neither simply centralization nor 
decentralization. HC itself is more integrated by HQ. However, the relationships between HQ 
and subordinates of HC is more nuanced. Subordinates of HC may be more integrated by HQ 
in the sense that HQ applies available scheme of CC more consistently. At the same time, 
however, they are more decentralized in the sense that HQ is less likely to acquire knowledge 
from them when they design scheme of CC. Furthermore, HC group becomes more 
independent than other subsidiaries during financial crisis. During financial crisis, HQ 
prioritize management of urgent and irregular issues, and HC group helps HQ save 
managerial resources required for normal CC. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Data, Variables, and Sample 
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 For empirical analysis, information about organizational structure of listed firms is 
collected from ORBIS. ORBIS is a database published by Bureau van Dijk, and its unique 
strength is the broad coverage of firms worldwide. Based on local registries and public data, 
the database covers public as well as private firms. Also, it reports subsidiaries of each firm 
(if any). Starting from listed firms, I searched their subsidiaries, and then subsidiaries of those 
subsidiaries. After repeating this procedure, I could construct hierarchical structure of each 
listed firm. Subsidiaries are defined by majority ownership. To understand simple effects of 
HC, sample of subsidiaries are limited to 1) those that are not controlled by a holding 
company (i.e. none of subsidiaries between the HQ and the focal subsidiary in the hierarchy 
is a HC), 2) those that are HCs with at least three controlling subsidiary, and 3) those that are 
controlled by one HC (i.e. only one of subsidiaries between the HQ and the focal subsidiary 
in the hierarchy is a HC). In other words, subsidiaries controlled by more than one HC are 
excluded. It is because the complexity caused by multiple HCs cannot be interpreted clearly. 
Also, HCs controlling less than three subsidiaries are excluded because their roles may be 
different from typical HCs discussed in this paper. HCs with small number of subordinates do 
not introduce significant modularity. 
I collected data on hierarchical structure in 2006, 2008, and 2010 by using ORBIS 
disks published in 2007, 2009, and 2011. The sample is limited to manufacturing firms.  
To test the hypotheses, the following linear probability model is examined.  
𝑀𝑝,𝑠,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑋𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑌𝑠,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑠,𝑡𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑠𝐼𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑍𝑝,𝑠,𝑡 + 𝜀𝑝,𝑠,𝑡 
Where 𝑀𝑝,𝑠,𝑡 represents dependent variables related to managerial integration, 𝑋𝑠,𝑡 and 𝑌𝑠,𝑡 
are dummy variables signifying a HC and a subordinate of a HC respectively. 𝐼𝑡is the 
financial crisis variable for the third set of hypotheses, and 𝑍𝑝,𝑠,𝑡 represents control variables. 
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 Three dependent variables related to managerial integration are defined by the 
following procedures. ORBIS reports names of top managers. In the original sample of HQ 
and subsidiaries, 5.1 managers are reported by a firm in average.  
 Dual assignment of manager. The first dependent variable is dual assignment of 
manager in TMTs of both HQ and a subsidiary. Lists of managers are derived from ORBIS 
disks published in early 2009 and early 2011 that record information at the end of 2008 and 
2010. This variable is one if at least one manager is recorded as a manager of HQ as well as 
subsidiary in the same year.  
As ORBIS reports names of managers without identification codes, identical 
managers need to be found by matching names by the following steps. First, full names of 
managers are compared, and identical managers are detected if managers are matched by full 
names. Second, combinations of first and last names are compared with dropping middle 
names, and managers are identified by matching first and last names combined. This step is 
necessary because ORBIS sometimes reports middle names in addition to first and last 
names, and comparing reported full name fails to capture the same managers when they are 
reported by the first, middle, and last names in one firm, and by only the first and last names 
in the other. Lastly, when the first name of a manager is only one letter, combination of the 
first letter of the first name and the whole last name is compared. This step allows to capture 
managers whose initial letter of the first name is reported as the first name. 
Transfer of managers down to subsidiary. This is the second dependent variable. 
Transfer of managers is defined by comparing different vintages of ORBIS disks. For 
example, transfer of managers between 2006 and 2008 is detected by comparing 2007 and 
2009 vintages that report information in 2006 and 2008 respectively. Transfer of managers 
down to subsidiary is determined to have happened if at least one of managers of HQ in 2006 
was not in TMT of a subsidiary in 2006, but became a member of TMT of the subsidiary in 
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2008. Managers are identified by the name matching procedure explained above. Transfer of 
managers between 2008 and 2010 is found by the same steps using ORBIS vintages of 2009 
and 2011 reporting information in 2008 and 2010. 
Transfer of managers up from subsidiary. This third dependent variable is a dummy 
variable that is one if there is at least one manager in subsidiary in year 2006 (or 2008) was 
not included in TMT of HQ in the same year, but became a member of it in year 2008 (or 
2010). Transfers are defined by using the same data and name matching procedure utilized 
for Transfer of managers down to subsidiary. 
Holding company. The first explanatory variable is a dummy variable that is one if the 
focal subsidiary is a holding company. ORBIS reports the activity of each firm by industry 
codes including NACE rev.1.1. A subsidiary is regarded as a holding company if its NACE 
rev1.1 is 7415 or its company name includes “Holding”. Holding companies are further 
categorized as geographically-specialized HC (geo-HC), functionally-specialized HC 
(function-HC), and product-line HC (product-HC) for additional analyses. A HC is a geo-HC 
if its controlling subordinates are from one country or region (Americas, EMEA, or APAC) 
while its immediate parent controls subsidiaries from more than one country or region. A HC 
is a function-HC if it is not a geo-HC and its controlling subordinates are engaged in only one 
activity defined by NACE rev 1.1. A HC is a product-HC if it is not geo-HC and its 
subordinates are engaged in multiple activities to form one integral business unit as HC 
group. 
HC subordinate. The second explanatory variable is a dummy variable that is one if 
the focal subsidiary is controlled by a holding company. This variable captures not only 
subsidiaries immediately owned by a HC, but also those indirectly owned by a HC.  
A number of control variables are added. Concerning parent firm, Firm size is 
consolidated firm size measured by logged total asset. Profitability is consolidated firm 
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profitability measured by EBITDA over total asset. Geographical scope is a number of 
regions (i.e. America, EMEA, and APAC) the focal firm is operating. Host country 
characteristics are controlled by Market size, Rule of law, and Distance from HQ that are 
calculated by logged GDP, Rule of law index from World Governance Indicators, and logged 
km of geographical distance from HQ. Lastly, subsidiary characteristics are controlled by the 
following variables. Subsidiary size (logged total asset of subsidiary), Subsidiary age (logged 
age of subsidiary), subsidiary activities (dummy for Manufacturing, Research, Distribution, 
Service, Finance), dummy for Wholly-owned subsidiaries (total shareholding of more than 
95% by the HQ), number of subordinates, and Organizational distance from HQ (1+number 
of subsidiaries between the HC and the focal subsidiary on organization hierarchy chart). 
Data on Market size and Rule of law are from World Bank and World Governance Indicators, 
respectively. Other variables are based on data from ORBIS. After dropping observations 
with missing or unreasonable (i.e. profitability lower than -0.3 or higher than 0.8) values, 
33,109 observations (unit of analysis is subsidiary-year) remain. Table 3-1 summarizes the 
definitions of variables, and descriptive statistics. Table 3-3 shows correlations among them. 
Lastly, firm fixed effects are employed to control unobservable characteristics of each firm. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 3-2 and 3-3 about here 
================================================= 
Results 
 Some interesting associations between control and dependent variables are found in 
Model 1-3. Market size and rule of law in host countries are both positively associated with 
dual assignment and transfer to HQ though they are not associated with transfer to subsidiary. 
This is consistent with the argument about two facets of CC. Subsidiaries in developed 
countries should play more central roles for a firm and inter-related with other subsidiaries 
Hence its CC scheme is more likely to be designed at HQ with information input to HQ. 
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Among subsidiary controls, subsidiary size, age, number of subordinates are positively 
associated with managerial integration as expected. This suggests that large and older 
subsidiaries are more likely to be central for a firm. Also, research subsidiaries see more 
integration, and more transfer of managers to HQ. It reflects the fact that research function 
creates new knowledge that can be applied to broad range of subsidiaries controlled by the 
HQ. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 3-4 about here 
================================================= 
 Model 4-6 show results concerning the first two sets of hypotheses. Hypotheses 1a-c 
are supported by the positive and significant coefficients of HC. Note that the coefficient is 
not significant in Model 6, but it becomes significant when the effect of financial crisis is 
controlled in Model 9. As a centre of HC group whose operation as a whole is important for a 
firm and related with other part of firm’s operations, HC is closely controlled and coordinated 
by the HQ in relation to both facets of CC. Coefficients of Subordinate of HC turns out to be 
positive and significant, supporting Hypotheses 2a-i and 2b-i rather than 2a-ii and 2b-ii. It 
suggests that the HC’s effect of facilitating consistent CC is greater than its effect of making 
HQ’s intervention less necessary. Consistent with Hypothesis 2c, Subordinate of HC is 
negatively associated with transfer of managers to HQ in Model 6. Specializing in a certain 
activity, subordinates of HC are less inter-related with other subsidiaries outside of HC 
group, which leads to less need for designing CC scheme at HQ. 
 Model 7-9 show results related to the third set of hypotheses. As predicted by the 
hypotheses, the degree of managerial integration is particularly lowered during financial 
crisis. Coefficients of interaction terms between HC and year 2010, and between subordinate 
of HC and year 2010 are all negative and significant except Model 9. The magnitude of the 
negative effects is as large as to cancel the main (positive) effects of HC structure. It means 
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that integration of HC group is no longer greater than other subsidiaries. During crisis, HC 
group operate as independently as other subsidiaries.  
Robustness Check 
 To validate the reliability of the results, I check the robustness in several ways. First, 
the effect of HC may be limited to certain types of HC. To examine the issue, I categorized 
HC into three groups, product-line HC, geographically-focused HC, and functionally-focused 
HC. Results in Table 3-5 show that all types of HC contribute to the results generally. 
 Second, conditional logit model is adopted instead of linear probability model because 
the dependent variables are binary, and, though it is controversial, some researchers prefer 
non-linear model. The results are shown in Table 3-6, and are consistent with the main 
results. 
================================================= 
Insert Table 3-5 and 3-6 about here 
================================================= 
CONCLUSION 
 This study aims at examining the role of HCs in hierarchy. To understand HCs, 
concept of CC is examined and two facets of it – designing CC schemes and applying them – 
are identified. Based on the refinement of CC concept, characteristics of HCs are defined. 
First, HC as a pivot of a group specialized in a certain activity is more intensively integrated 
by HQ in terms of the both facets of CC. Second, while subordinates of HCs are intensively 
integrated by HQ in terms of application of CC schemes, they are less likely contribute to 
designing CC schemes. Further, HC structure enables HQ to save managerial resources by 
lowering the degree of integration, and letting HC group operate more independently during 
crisis. This study contributes to organization theory by refining the concept of CC. Though 
CC is a central mechanism in the organization, previous studies understood it too narrowly or 
too broadly. Unpacking two facets of CC, this study explains an important organizational 
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mechanism: assignments and transfers of managers. Another contribution of this study is 
clarifying the role of HC. Widely used in practice, HC plays unique and important role for 
CC in organizations. Tightly integrated within, it is intensively controlled through application 
of CC schemes. On the other hand, specialized in a certain activity, HQ does not design CC 
scheme for each of HC subordinates. This nuanced role of HC should be understood further 
by future studies. One limitation of this study is that the purpose of managerial assignment 
and transfer is not explicitly clear. It is broadly agreed that CC is a main purpose, but other 
reasons such as tapping talented manager, and rewarding managers by promotions cannot be 
excluded. However, it is hard to believe any purpose other than CC would systematically 
drive the empirical results. 
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Table 3-1: Relationships between characteristics of CC and relevant direction of transfer
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Table 3-2: Definitions and descriptive statistics of variables
 
  
Variable names Definition Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Parent
Firm size Log total asset of the consolidated firm 33109 15.169 2.353 6.458 20.497
Profitability EBITDA over total asset of the consolidated firm 33109 0.115 0.074 -0.300 0.767
Geographical scope Number of regions with operation (America, EMEA, and APAC) 33109 2.679 0.654 1 3
Host country
Market size Log GDP of host country 33109 14.037 1.012 7.982 16.545
Rule of law Rule of law index 33109 1.471 0.515 -1.645 1.977
Distance from the HQ Log km of distance from the HQ 33109 5.009 3.713 0 9.844
Subsidiary
Subsidiary size Log total asset of subsidiary 33109 9.886 2.765 0 20.392
Subsidiary age Log age of subsidiary 33109 3.064 0.741 0 5.421
Manufactuing subsidiary Dummy for manufacturing subsidiary (by NACE rev.1.1) 33109 0.390 0.488 0 1
Research subsidiary Dummy for research subsidiary (by NACE rev.1.1) 33109 0.010 0.099 0 1
Distribution subsidiary Dummy for distribution subsidiary (by NACE rev.1.1) 33109 0.299 0.458 0 1
Service subsidiary Dummy for service subsidiary (by NACE rev.1.1) 33109 0.190 0.393 0 1
Financial subsidiary Dummy for financial subsidiary (by NACE rev.1.1) 33109 0.063 0.242 0 1
Wholly owned subsidiary Dummy for subsidiary owned by >95% shareholding 33109 0.802 0.399 0 1
Domestic subsidiary Dummy for domestic subsidiary 33109 0.337 0.473 0 1
N of subordinates Number of subordinates that subsidiary controls 33109 4.953 26.023 0 580
Org distance from the HQ 1+Number of subsidiaries between the HQ and the focal subsidiary on org chart 33109 1.826 0.996 1 7
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Table 3-3: Correlations among variables 
Variable names 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
1 Firm size 1
2 Profitability 0.0625 1
3 Geographical scope 0.5506 0.0944 1
4 Market size -0.0329 -0.0297 0.0162 1
5 Rule of law -0.1203 0.0143 0.0186 -0.0039 1
6 Distance from the HQ 0.2224 0.0704 0.3251 -0.0608 -0.0557 1
7 Subsidiary size 0.3707 0.0236 0.2108 0.0247 -0.1756 0.0524 1
8 Subsidiary age 0.1065 0.0213 0.0945 0.0599 0.0107 -0.0814 0.2028 1
9 Manufactuing subsidiary -0.0401 -0.0099 -0.0266 0.0421 -0.1369 -0.0628 0.1748 0.1745 1
10 Research subsidiary -0.0127 -0.0354 -0.0068 0.0158 0.0283 -0.0063 -0.0287 -0.0494 -0.0795 1
11 Distribution subsidiary 0.0111 0.0564 0.0365 -0.1164 0.0139 0.1993 -0.1158 -0.0007 -0.5222 -0.0651 1
12 Service subsidiary -0.0382 -0.0299 0.0056 0.0898 0.0997 -0.063 -0.0477 -0.1593 -0.3875 -0.0483 -0.3171 1
13 Financial subsidiary 0.0911 -0.0305 0.0276 -0.0378 0.0803 -0.0632 0.0019 -0.0546 -0.2065 -0.0257 -0.169 -0.1254 1
14 Wholly owned subsidiary -0.0973 0.0169 -0.0411 -0.0249 0.145 -0.0429 -0.1599 -0.0683 -0.0445 -0.0005 0.0572 -0.0046 -0.0021 1
15 Domestic subsidiary -0.2215 -0.0754 -0.321 0.0945 0.0392 -0.961 -0.031 0.0664 0.0683 0.0101 -0.2115 0.0732 0.0615 0.0055 1
16 N of subordinates 0.1105 -0.0314 0.0637 0.0419 -0.0422 -0.1385 0.3353 0.2411 0.0627 -0.0154 -0.0963 0.0611 -0.0101 -0.1911 0.1427 1
17 Org distance from the HQ 0.3393 0.0003 0.2058 0.0428 0.0335 0.1499 -0.0353 0.0254 0.0069 -0.0054 0.0011 -0.0524 0.0194 0.0178 -0.1706 -0.0954 1
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Table 3-4: Main results 
  




















Firm size -0.0278+ -0.000119 -0.0189+ -0.0261 0.00105 -0.0194+ -0.0266 0.00163 -0.0193+
(-1.71) (-0.01) (-1.77) (-1.60) (0.10) (-1.81) (-1.63) (0.15) (-1.80)
Profitability -0.0104 -0.172** -0.104** -0.00861 -0.170** -0.105** -0.0140 -0.176** -0.107**
(-0.19) (-4.75) (-2.89) (-0.16) (-4.71) (-2.90) (-0.26) (-4.86) (-2.97)
Geographical scope 0.0143 0.00309 0.00370 0.0137 0.00297 0.00360 0.0123 0.00161 0.00297
(1.13) (0.36) (0.44) (1.08) (0.35) (0.43) (0.97) (0.19) (0.35)
Market size 0.0130** -0.000393 0.00697** 0.0121** -0.000772 0.00702** 0.0119** -0.000916 0.00693**
(5.91) (-0.26) (4.68) (5.49) (-0.51) (4.71) (5.42) (-0.61) (4.64)
Rule of law 0.0312** -0.00191 0.0109** 0.0289** -0.00270 0.0105** 0.0289** -0.00265 0.0105**
(6.66) (-0.60) (3.53) (6.16) (-0.84) (3.40) (6.18) (-0.83) (3.40)
Distance from the HQ -0.0120** -0.00262 0.00127 -0.0117** -0.00267 0.00138 -0.0117** -0.00272 0.00135
(-3.20) (-0.98) (0.49) (-3.14) (-1.00) (0.54) (-3.13) (-1.02) (0.52)
Subsidiary size 0.0129** 0.00241** 0.00441** 0.0121** 0.00207** 0.00441** 0.0122** 0.00208** 0.00441**
(15.42) (4.28) (7.97) (14.42) (3.64) (7.86) (14.48) (3.65) (7.87)
Subsidiary age 0.0171** 0.00601** 0.00385* 0.0178** 0.00592** 0.00424* 0.0177** 0.00578** 0.00417*
(5.96) (3.12) (2.01) (6.17) (3.07) (2.21) (6.15) (3.00) (2.17)
Manufactuing subsidiary 0.0147 0.00831 0.00166 0.0164+ 0.00869 0.00209 0.0165+ 0.00889 0.00217
(1.51) (1.32) (0.27) (1.69) (1.38) (0.33) (1.70) (1.41) (0.35)
Research subsidiary 0.0694** -0.00320 0.0295+ 0.0712** -0.00294 0.0300+ 0.0716** -0.00261 0.0302+
(3.02) (-0.20) (1.90) (3.10) (-0.19) (1.93) (3.12) (-0.17) (1.94)
Distribution subsidiary -0.0261** -0.00509 -0.00945 -0.0251* -0.00478 -0.00924 -0.0249* -0.00467 -0.00919
(-2.62) (-0.78) (-1.46) (-2.52) (-0.74) (-1.43) (-2.51) (-0.72) (-1.42)
Service subsidiary 0.0356** 0.00369 0.00218 0.0204+ 0.000227 -0.000888 0.0206+ 0.000425 -0.000832
(3.48) (0.55) (0.33) (1.94) (0.03) (-0.13) (1.96) (0.06) (-0.12)
Financial subsidiary 0.0132 0.000846 -0.00395 0.0103 0.000301 -0.00451 0.0112 0.00105 -0.00400
(1.12) (0.11) (-0.51) (0.88) (0.04) (-0.58) (0.96) (0.13) (-0.52)
Wholly owned subsidiary 0.00306 0.000946 -0.000787 0.00241 0.000437 -0.000558 0.00245 0.000494 -0.000494
(0.60) (0.28) (-0.24) (0.47) (0.13) (-0.17) (0.48) (0.15) (-0.15)
Domestic subsidiary 0.0550* 0.00194 0.0191 0.0579* 0.00199 0.0201 0.0582* 0.00181 0.0200
(2.14) (0.11) (1.09) (2.26) (0.11) (1.14) (2.27) (0.10) (1.13)
N of subordinates 0.00220** 0.000678** 0.0000683 0.00210** 0.000659** 0.0000594 0.00208** 0.000646** 0.0000519
(20.13) (10.83) (1.09) (19.06) (10.46) (0.94) (18.86) (10.25) (0.82)
Org distance from the HQ -0.0154** -0.00109 -0.00923** -0.0171** -0.00388* -0.00681** -0.0173** -0.00404* -0.00689**
(-6.73) (-0.72) (-6.17) (-6.41) (-2.22) (-3.91) (-6.47) (-2.31) (-3.95)
Year 2010 0.0141** -0.00152 -0.0178** 0.0138** -0.00178 -0.0176** 0.0220** 0.00476+ -0.0144**
(3.80) (-0.63) (-7.39) (3.74) (-0.74) (-7.31) (5.02) (1.66) (-5.05)
HC 0.0601** 0.0164** 0.00937 0.0804** 0.0299** 0.0187*
(6.73) (2.74) (1.57) (7.51) (3.94) (2.47)
Subordinate of HC 0.0165** 0.0143** -0.00910* 0.0256** 0.0241** -0.00500
(2.74) (3.64) (-2.32) (3.60) (5.06) (-1.05)
HC x Year 2010 -0.0510** -0.0291** -0.0201*
(-3.42) (-2.91) (-2.01)
Subord. of HC x Year2010 -0.0213* -0.0206** -0.00853
(-2.43) (-3.62) (-1.51)
Constant 0.296 0.0368 0.188 0.289 0.0315 0.190 0.299 0.0266 0.190
(1.18) (0.22) (1.14) (1.16) (0.19) (1.15) (1.19) (0.16) (1.15)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R squares 0.519 0.206 0.253 0.520 0.206 0.253 0.520 0.207 0.253
N 32264 29228 29560 32264 29228 29560 32264 29228 29560
t statistics in parentheses
p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01
Three forms of managerial integration are estimated by linear probability model
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Table 3-5: Robustness check (by HC category)
  














Firm size -0.0253 0.000680 -0.0189+ -0.0260 0.00151 -0.0186+
(-1.56) (0.06) (-1.76) (-1.60) (0.14) (-1.73)
Profitability -0.0126 -0.167** -0.107** -0.0216 -0.169** -0.112**
(-0.23) (-4.61) (-2.97) (-0.39) (-4.66) (-3.09)
Geographical scope 0.0135 0.00302 0.00359 0.0122 0.00140 0.00351
(1.07) (0.36) (0.42) (0.96) (0.17) (0.41)
Market size 0.0120** -0.000609 0.00697** 0.0118** -0.000693 0.00680**
(5.42) (-0.40) (4.67) (5.34) (-0.46) (4.55)
Rule of law 0.0288** -0.00266 0.0106** 0.0289** -0.00266 0.0106**
(6.13) (-0.83) (3.43) (6.15) (-0.83) (3.42)
Distance from the HQ -0.0116** -0.00285 0.00145 -0.0116** -0.00302 0.00162
(-3.11) (-1.07) (0.56) (-3.09) (-1.13) (0.63)
Subsidiary size 0.0121** 0.00198** 0.00445** 0.0122** 0.00199** 0.00445**
(14.40) (3.47) (7.91) (14.46) (3.49) (7.92)
Subsidiary age 0.0178** 0.00586** 0.00425* 0.0177** 0.00568** 0.00421*
(6.18) (3.04) (2.21) (6.15) (2.94) (2.19)
Manufactuing subsidiary 0.0167+ 0.00865 0.00196 0.0164+ 0.00932 0.00166
(1.72) (1.38) (0.31) (1.68) (1.48) (0.26)
Research subsidiary 0.0715** -0.00322 0.0299+ 0.0715** -0.00260 0.0297+
(3.12) (-0.21) (1.92) (3.12) (-0.17) (1.91)
Distribution subsidiary -0.0250* -0.00486 -0.00943 -0.0253* -0.00426 -0.00968
(-2.51) (-0.75) (-1.46) (-2.54) (-0.66) (-1.50)
Service subsidiary 0.0204+ 0.000184 -0.00102 0.0201+ 0.000874 -0.00138
(1.95) (0.03) (-0.15) (1.92) (0.13) (-0.20)
Financial subsidiary 0.0106 0.0000720 -0.00472 0.0111 0.00123 -0.00447
(0.90) (0.01) (-0.61) (0.94) (0.16) (-0.58)
Wholly owned subsidiary 0.00236 0.000362 -0.000561 0.00243 0.000440 -0.000492
(0.46) (0.11) (-0.17) (0.48) (0.13) (-0.15)
Domestic subsidiary 0.0585* 0.000708 0.0206 0.0590* -0.000166 0.0217
(2.28) (0.04) (1.17) (2.30) (-0.01) (1.23)
N of subordinates 0.00209** 0.000641** 0.0000726 0.00207** 0.000625** 0.0000647
(18.45) (9.98) (1.13) (18.24) (9.72) (1.01)
Org distance from the HQ -0.0167** -0.00419* -0.00663** -0.0170** -0.00434* -0.00674**
(-6.22) (-2.38) (-3.77) (-6.31) (-2.46) (-3.84)
Year 2010 0.0139** -0.00187 -0.0176** 0.0219** 0.00489+ -0.0146**
(3.76) (-0.78) (-7.32) (5.01) (1.71) (-5.11)
product-HC 0.0644** 0.0275** 0.00189 0.0769** 0.0552** 0.00493
(4.35) (2.88) (0.20) (4.14) (4.50) (0.40)
geo-HC 0.0601** 0.0157* 0.0142* 0.0817** 0.0210* 0.0290**
(5.74) (2.18) (1.99) (6.42) (2.23) (3.10)
function-HC 0.0473+ -0.0245 0.000233 0.0877** -0.0104 -0.000980
(1.73) (-1.35) (0.01) (2.61) (-0.44) (-0.04)
Subord. Of product-HC 0.0147+ 0.0166** -0.00785 0.0225* 0.0293** -0.0109+
(1.94) (3.38) (-1.61) (2.45) (4.85) (-1.80)
Subord. Of geo-HC 0.0217** 0.00929+ -0.00922+ 0.0299** 0.0184** 0.00119
(2.85) (1.84) (-1.84) (3.24) (2.93) (0.19)
Subord. Of function-HC -0.0130 0.0371** -0.0226+ 0.0169 0.0245 0.00275
(-0.72) (3.17) (-1.93) (0.69) (1.49) (0.17)
product-HC x Year 2010 -0.0285 -0.0604** -0.00620
(-1.07) (-3.54) (-0.36)
geo-HC x Year 2010 -0.0558** -0.0121 -0.0311*
(-3.01) (-0.95) (-2.45)
function-HC x Year 2010 -0.110* -0.0336 0.00432
(-2.02) (-0.94) (0.12)
Subord. Of product-HC x Year 2010 -0.0172 -0.0266** 0.00646
(-1.51) (-3.64) (0.89)
Subord. Of geo-HC x Year 2010 -0.0201 -0.0200* -0.0227**
(-1.57) (-2.41) (-2.76)
Subord. Of function-HC x Year 2010 -0.0620+ 0.0240 -0.0487*
(-1.81) (1.08) (-2.20)
Constant 0.279 0.0374 0.182 0.293 0.0286 0.178
(1.11) (0.22) (1.10) (1.17) (0.17) (1.08)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
adjusted R squares 0.520 0.206 0.253 0.520 0.207 0.254
N 32264 29228 29560 32264 29228 29560
t statistics in parentheses
p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01
Three forms of managerial integration are estimated by linear probability model
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Table 3-6: Robustness check (conditional logit model) 
  




















Firm size -0.234 0.0961 -0.517+ -0.221 0.128 -0.531+ -0.222 0.140 -0.571*
(-1.39) (0.38) (-1.87) (-1.31) (0.51) (-1.92) (-1.31) (0.55) (-2.06)
Profitability -0.0352 -3.229** -2.391* -0.0318 -3.217** -2.357* -0.0848 -3.293** -2.377*
(-0.06) (-3.74) (-2.21) (-0.05) (-3.72) (-2.17) (-0.14) (-3.81) (-2.19)
Geographical scope 0.0990 0.0363 0.178 0.0945 0.0309 0.182 0.0885 -0.0287 0.174
(0.83) (0.20) (0.87) (0.79) (0.17) (0.89) (0.74) (-0.15) (0.85)
Market size 0.210** 0.0319 0.267** 0.202** 0.0133 0.272** 0.200** 0.00839 0.268**
(7.95) (0.64) (5.45) (7.62) (0.27) (5.53) (7.53) (0.17) (5.45)
Rule of law 0.486** 0.153 0.428** 0.468** 0.128 0.424** 0.469** 0.131 0.422**
(7.92) (1.33) (4.14) (7.60) (1.11) (4.09) (7.61) (1.14) (4.06)
Distance from the HQ -0.202** -0.0579 0.0462 -0.197** -0.0601 0.0415 -0.197** -0.0642 0.0419
(-4.35) (-0.62) (0.59) (-4.24) (-0.65) (0.53) (-4.23) (-0.69) (0.54)
Subsidiary size 0.138** 0.0916** 0.141** 0.133** 0.0807** 0.142** 0.133** 0.0806** 0.142**
(13.83) (5.37) (7.93) (13.26) (4.69) (7.90) (13.28) (4.68) (7.92)
Subsidiary age 0.178** 0.201** 0.103+ 0.183** 0.203** 0.108* 0.182** 0.196** 0.108*
(5.54) (3.56) (1.91) (5.66) (3.56) (1.99) (5.65) (3.43) (1.99)
Manufactuing subsidiary 0.240* 0.168 -0.0566 0.244* 0.159 -0.0489 0.242* 0.163 -0.0510
(2.08) (0.87) (-0.31) (2.12) (0.82) (-0.27) (2.11) (0.84) (-0.28)
Research subsidiary 0.645** -0.191 0.535 0.656** -0.205 0.535 0.659** -0.196 0.523
(2.75) (-0.38) (1.57) (2.79) (-0.41) (1.57) (2.80) (-0.39) (1.54)
Distribution subsidiary -0.239* -0.311 -0.417* -0.235* -0.310 -0.415* -0.237* -0.311 -0.418*
(-2.01) (-1.51) (-2.15) (-1.98) (-1.50) (-2.14) (-1.99) (-1.50) (-2.15)
Service subsidiary 0.343** 0.189 -0.0236 0.226+ 0.0813 -0.0767 0.225+ 0.0880 -0.0739
(2.84) (0.94) (-0.12) (1.82) (0.39) (-0.38) (1.81) (0.42) (-0.36)
Financial subsidiary 0.199 0.0276 -0.197 0.179 -0.00746 -0.221 0.187 0.0115 -0.214
(1.46) (0.11) (-0.84) (1.31) (-0.03) (-0.94) (1.37) (0.05) (-0.91)
Wholly owned subsidiary 0.0265 -0.00883 0.00148 0.0187 -0.0190 0.0102 0.0185 -0.0184 0.00868
(0.47) (-0.09) (0.02) (0.33) (-0.19) (0.11) (0.33) (-0.19) (0.09)
Domestic subsidiary -0.182 0.136 0.554 -0.143 0.137 0.528 -0.138 0.114 0.532
(-0.58) (0.22) (1.04) (-0.46) (0.22) (0.99) (-0.44) (0.18) (1.00)
N of subordinates 0.0222** 0.00917** 0.00259 0.0208** 0.00860** 0.00250 0.0207** 0.00863** 0.00227
(12.32) (6.16) (1.43) (11.63) (5.83) (1.37) (11.56) (5.80) (1.24)
Org distance from the HQ 0.161** -0.0390 -0.469** 0.155** -0.0422 -0.467** 0.235** 0.143+ -0.335**
(4.13) (-0.61) (-7.08) (3.96) (-0.66) (-7.05) (5.10) (1.89) (-4.51)
Year 2010 -0.181** -0.0460 -0.353** -0.223** -0.152** -0.279** -0.225** -0.161** -0.284**
(-6.38) (-0.94) (-6.71) (-6.62) (-2.59) (-4.70) (-6.67) (-2.74) (-4.78)
HC 0.413** 0.485** 0.0824 0.596** 0.756** 0.259
(4.52) (3.32) (0.52) (5.53) (4.44) (1.40)
Subordinate of HC 0.235** 0.520** -0.302* 0.336** 0.809** -0.0419
(3.32) (4.19) (-2.43) (4.02) (5.65) (-0.30)
HC x Year 2010 -0.454** -0.653** -0.441+
(-3.16) (-2.89) (-1.77)
Subord. of HC x Year2010 -0.218* -0.617** -0.721**
(-2.25) (-3.86) (-3.63)
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -7114.5 -2589.5 -2630.6 -7101.2 -2577.9 -2627.1 -7094.6 -2567.8 -2619.3
N 23329 12759 11869 23329 12759 11869 23329 12759 11869
t statistics in parentheses
p<0.10,  * p<0.05,  ** p<0.01
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